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Security audit

Google Drive Upload File

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it says: it tells an agent how to upload a user-selected local file to Google Drive, with no hidden code or persistence.

Install only if you intend agents to upload specified local files to Google Drive through gog. Before use, confirm the exact path and avoid uploading secrets, credentials, personal data, or files you do not want stored in that Drive account.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs an agent to upload a local file to Google Drive, a third-party cloud service, but provides no warning, consent requirement, or data-sensitivity guardrails. This creates a real risk of unintended exfiltration of sensitive local data, especially because the command is presented as a direct action pattern for any file path.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.