Incomplete referenced artifact analysis
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md Read `references/shared-base.md` and `references/shared-config.md` for code templates.
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is rated suspicious with medium confidence because scanners report deployment and data-sharing concerns and incomplete inspection of some referenced material.
Consider the unresolved inspection gaps and whether you are comfortable with guidance that could upload project content or publish it if followed. The scan does not show that deployment or credential access occurred, but its evidence is incomplete; avoid installing unless those limitations and the deployment steps are acceptable to you.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
Read `references/shared-base.md` and `references/shared-config.md` for code templates.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
基础层模板见 `references/shared-base.md`(含 logger.ts 和 log-export.ts)。
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- **网络库**:原生 fetch 封装(不用 axios),见 references/shared-base.md
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
│ │ └── validate.ts # 表单校验工具
│ └── types/
│ └── global.d.ts # 全局类型声明
├── .env # 公共环境变量
├── .env.development # 开发环境
├── .env.test # 测试环境
├── .env.production # 生产环境
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
│ ├── main.{tsx|ts} # App entry — mount, global providers, styles
│ └── vite-env.d.ts # Vite client type reference
│
├── .env # Common env (loaded in all modes)
├── .env.development # Dev env overrides
├── .env.test # Test env overrides
├── .env.production # Prod env overrides
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
VITE_APP_TITLE=My App
VITE_STORAGE_PREFIX=app_
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
/**
* Application-level constants and configuration.
* Environment-specific values come from .env files via import.meta.env.
*/
export const APP_NAME = import.meta.env.VITE_APP_TITLE || 'My App';
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
│ └── default.json # Permission capabilities ├── package.json ├── vite.config.ts └── .env / .env.development / .env.production
### Step 5: Key Templates
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
│ └── types/
│ └── global.d.ts # 全局类型声明
├── .env # 公共环境变量
├── .env.development # 开发环境
├── .env.test # 测试环境
├── .env.production # 生产环境
└── package.json # Scripts 配置
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
│ └── vite-env.d.ts # Vite client type reference
│
├── .env # Common env (loaded in all modes)
├── .env.development # Dev env overrides
├── .env.test # Test env overrides
├── .env.production # Prod env overrides
│
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
env files:
.env.local # Local overrides (gitignored)
.env.development # NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=http://localhost:3000
.env.production # NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=https://api.example.com
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
│ └── default.json # Permission capabilities ├── package.json ├── vite.config.ts └── .env / .env.development / .env.production
### Step 5: Key Templates
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
├── .env # 公共环境变量 ├── .env.development # 开发环境 ├── .env.test # 测试环境 ├── .env.production # 生产环境 └── package.json # Scripts 配置
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
├── .env # Common env (loaded in all modes)
├── .env.development # Dev env overrides
├── .env.test # Test env overrides
├── .env.production # Prod env overrides
│
├── index.html # Vite HTML entry point
├── package.json # Dependencies + scripts
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
VITE_API_BASE_URL=https://test-api.example.com
### .env.production
VITE_API_BASE_URL=https://api.example.com
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
.env.local # Local overrides (gitignored)
.env.development # NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=http://localhost:3000
.env.production # NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=https://api.example.com
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
│ └── default.json # Permission capabilities ├── package.json ├── vite.config.ts └── .env / .env.development / .env.production
### Step 5: Key Templates
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
基础设施层模板见 `references/shared-infrastructure.md`(状态管理、主题系统、i18n、通用 Hooks、全局组件、布局、路由守卫、常量配置)。
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
build/
# Environment
.env.local
.env.*.local
# IDE
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
env files:
.env.local # Local overrides (gitignored)
.env.development # NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=http://localhost:3000
.env.production # NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL=https://api.example.com
The deployment commands are embedded in the normal final-setup workflow without a local consent gate. This creates ambiguity about whether an executing agent should continue beyond local scaffolding; the parent document's guidance-only restriction mitigates, but does not eliminate, that conflicting workflow instruction.
If executed and authorized with Vercel credentials, the listed command can upload deployable project files to third-party infrastructure. Presenting it as final setup without explaining that transfer weakens informed consent, especially for an internal admin project; merely displaying the instructions does not itself upload anything.
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
bun add -g vercel vercel
Or connect GitHub repo at vercel.com for auto-deploy.
Deployment commands, including a production deployment, appear directly in final setup without an explicit request gate. An agent treating workflow blocks as executable steps could exceed local scaffolding scope, although the parent guidance-only boundary reduces that risk.