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Security audit

Manage Agent Skills

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rated this skill benign because its reported tool use appears consistent with managing agent skills, though some findings remain and one reference was only partly analyzed.

The verdict is benign with medium confidence, not a guarantee of safety. Consider whether the skill’s platform-management features and detected environment, file, and shell capabilities fit your needs; note that one referenced guide was only partly analyzed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (11)

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

md
| Unsupported platform | [Add an adapter](references/add-platform.md) |

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/adapters/antigravity.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

--platform antigravity --antigravity-surface app disable demo --dry-run

text

App/IDE defaults to `~/.gemini/config`; current CLI defaults to
`~/.gemini/antigravity-cli`. `--antigravity-config` overrides either root.
This adapter parks whole global skill directories in sibling `skills_disabled`;
explain that move in the preview. It does not manage workspace/plugin copies.

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/adapters/gemini.md (reported line 8)May include surrounding context.

md
Version 1.1.1 adds a separate Gemini adapter; v1.0.1 did not include it.
It discovers user/workspace `.gemini/skills` and `.agents/skills`, honors
`GEMINI_CLI_HOME`, and edits `skills.disabled` in one selected JSON/JSONC file.
`--gemini-scope workspace` uses `<cwd>/.gemini/settings.json`. Global
`skills.enabled=false` in that file blocks enable. Built-in/extension roots,
system configuration and trust gates are not replicated. Settings-file edits
require a restart according to the [configuration reference](https://geminicli.com/docs/reference/configuration/);

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/adapters/gemini.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

md
## Operational notes

`--platform gemini` manages `skills.disabled` in user settings;
`--gemini-scope workspace` selects `<cwd>/.gemini/settings.json`. Local workspace,
user and shared roots are indexed. Built-in/extension skills and other settings
layers require host verification. A global `skills.enabled=false` blocks enable.

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/platforms.md (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

md
lls`; selected JSONC | `disabledSkills` | Repository disable lists can further restrict user state. |
| OpenClaw | Native inventory or workspace/user/shared fallback | Native `config set` | Requires installed CLI for mutation; eligibility and agent allowlists remain host decisions. |
| Hermes | `$HERMES_HOME/skills`; selected YAML | Global/per-platform disable lists | External skill directories, profiles, environment/app gates are not fully enumerated. |
| Antigravity App/IDE | Selected global `~/.gemini/config/skills` | Directory parking | Workspace, legacy IDE and plugin roots are not managed. |
| Antigravity CLI | `--antigravity-surface cli`: `~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/skills` | Directory parking | Plugin controls belong to `agy plugin`; older releases may use different paths. |
| Gemini CLI (v1.1.1) | Local user/workspace/shared roots; selected JSON/JSONC | `skills.disabled` | Built-in, extension and other settings layers are not merged. |
| OpenCode (v1.1.1) | Global/project/compa

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/skillctl.py (reported line 2286)May include surrounding context.

python
parser.add_argument(
        "--antigravity-config",
        type=Path,
        help="Antigravity config directory holding skills/ (default ~/.gemini/config).",
    )
    parser.add_argument(
        "--groups",

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/skillctl.py (reported line 1047)May include surrounding context.

python
if not self.executable:
            inventory = self._fallback()
        else:
            result = subprocess.run(
                [self.executable, "skill", "list", "--json"],
                cwd=self.cwd,
                shell=False,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/skillctl.py (reported line 1198)May include surrounding context.

python
def _native_json(self, *arguments: str) -> Any | None:
        if not self.executable:
            return None
        result = subprocess.run(
            [self.executable, *arguments],
            cwd=self.cwd,
            env=self._environment(),

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/skillctl.py (reported line 1356)May include surrounding context.

python
completed = 0
            for command in commands:
                try:
                    result = subprocess.run(
                        command,
                        cwd=self.cwd,
                        env=self._environment(),

The installation-error workflow mandates a Chinese response without user language opt-in.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The instruction to stop and tell the user the quoted message requires a Chinese-language response regardless of the user's language. The skill provides no language choice or documented justification for this constraint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.