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Security audit

ytapi-youtube-transcript

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill retrieves YouTube transcripts, but its setup saves your secret key for future sessions without clearly explaining or limiting access.

Before setup, choose where the key will be stored and which sessions can access it. Prefer an existing connector, session-only credentials, or a scoped secret store, and use private temporary files. Signup shares your email with YTAPI, and transcript requests consume account credits.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/auth-setup.md (reported line 94)May include surrounding context.

md
2. Check it in the current session without printing it, for example
   `test -n "$YTAPI_API_KEY" && echo set`. If the session must be reloaded to
   see it, reload it or tell the user.
3. Delete the temporary files: `rm -f /tmp/ytapi-signup.json /tmp/ytapi-verify.json`.

The user can sign in at https://ytapi.dev/auth/login?utm_source=skill&utm_medium=auth-setup with the same email to
see usage, manage keys and buy credits.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

Get a transcript (1 credit)

bash
curl -s "https://api.ytapi.dev/v1/transcripts?video_id=VIDEO_ID_OR_URL&format=text" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $YTAPI_API_KEY"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/auth-setup.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

to request in one step.

bash
curl -s -X POST https://ytapi.dev/api/agent/signup \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email": "USER_EMAIL"}' \
  -o /tmp/ytapi-signup.json

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/auth-setup.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

bash
TOKEN=$(sed -n 's/.*"signup_token":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' /tmp/ytapi-signup.json)
curl -s -X POST https://ytapi.dev/api/agent/verify \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"signup_token\": \"$TOKEN\", \"code\": \"CODE\"}" \
  -o /tmp/ytapi-verify.json

The workflow persists the API key across sessions without requiring a user-facing warning about credential storage and future availability.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The workflow requires durable credential storage and availability to future sessions without explicitly informing the user or requiring approval of the storage scope. Allowing shell profiles or general configuration files without confidentiality requirements can expose the key to unrelated processes, future agent sessions, or configuration backups, enabling unauthorized API usage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.