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Security audit

ytapi-youtube-summarize

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The video-summary workflow fits its purpose, but setup saves your API key for future sessions without explaining that scope to you.

Before setup, choose session-only use or explicitly approve a protected credential store and which future sessions may access it. Those sessions could otherwise use the key and consume credits. Optional signup sends your email and verification code to YTAPI.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/auth-setup.md (reported line 94)May include surrounding context.

md
2. Check it in the current session without printing it, for example
   `test -n "$YTAPI_API_KEY" && echo set`. If the session must be reloaded to
   see it, reload it or tell the user.
3. Delete the temporary files: `rm -f /tmp/ytapi-signup.json /tmp/ytapi-verify.json`.

The user can sign in at https://ytapi.dev/auth/login?utm_source=skill&utm_medium=auth-setup with the same email to
see usage, manage keys and buy credits.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 54)May include surrounding context.

  1. Details (free): title, channel, length, caption languages.

    bash
    curl -s "https://api.ytapi.dev/v1/videos/VIDEO_ID/basic-info" -H "Authorization: Bearer $YTAPI_API_KEY"
    
  2. Transcript with timestamps (1 credit). Save it to a file; long videos

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

give long transcripts.

bash
curl -s "https://api.ytapi.dev/v1/transcripts?video_id=VIDEO_ID&format=segments&languages=en%2C%2A" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $YTAPI_API_KEY" -o /tmp/ytapi-transcript.json

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/auth-setup.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

to request in one step.

bash
curl -s -X POST https://ytapi.dev/api/agent/signup \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email": "USER_EMAIL"}' \
  -o /tmp/ytapi-signup.json

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/auth-setup.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

bash
TOKEN=$(sed -n 's/.*"signup_token":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' /tmp/ytapi-signup.json)
curl -s -X POST https://ytapi.dev/api/agent/verify \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"signup_token\": \"$TOKEN\", \"code\": \"CODE\"}" \
  -o /tmp/ytapi-verify.json

The workflow persistently stores the API key without warning the user about credential persistence and access by future sessions.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The workflow directs the agent to persist the credential for future sessions without explaining that persistence to the user or obtaining specific consent. Allowing shell profiles or general configuration files without access-control requirements can expose the key to other processes or future agent sessions, enabling unauthorized API use and credit consumption.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.