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Security audit

GitLab Agent Profile

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is marked suspicious because its chart-conversion fallback can silently download and run an unpinned npm package, and its declared tool scope is missing.

Consider the suspicious verdict and the scanner's DO_NOT_INSTALL recommendation before installing. The main concern is automatic execution of an unpinned npm package in a process that may have GitLab credentials; the scan was partial because several referenced paths were missing, so the evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (12)

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/update-profile-stats.py (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

python
def glab_json(path: str) -> object:
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ["glab", "api", path],
            check=True,
            text=True,

Tainted flow: 'path' from os.environ.get (line 191, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/update-profile-stats.py (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

python
def glab_json(path: str) -> object:
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ["glab", "api", path],
            check=True,
            text=True,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/update-profile-stats.py (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

python
def current_user() -> str:
    result = subprocess.run(
        [
            "glab",
            "api",

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/update-profile-stats.py (reported line 384)May include surrounding context.

python
webp_output.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    magick = shutil.which("magick")
    if magick:
        subprocess.run([magick, str(svg_output), str(webp_output)], check=True)
        return
    convert = shutil.which("convert")
    if convert:

Tainted flow: 'svg_output' from os.environ.get (line 457, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/update-profile-stats.py (reported line 384)May include surrounding context.

python
webp_output.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    magick = shutil.which("magick")
    if magick:
        subprocess.run([magick, str(svg_output), str(webp_output)], check=True)
        return
    convert = shutil.which("convert")
    if convert:

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/update-profile-stats.py (reported line 388)May include surrounding context.

python
return
    convert = shutil.which("convert")
    if convert:
        subprocess.run([convert, str(svg_output), str(webp_output)], check=True)
        return
    npm = shutil.which("npm")
    if npm:

Tainted flow: 'svg_output' from os.environ.get (line 457, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/update-profile-stats.py (reported line 388)May include surrounding context.

python
return
    convert = shutil.which("convert")
    if convert:
        subprocess.run([convert, str(svg_output), str(webp_output)], check=True)
        return
    npm = shutil.which("npm")
    if npm:

The chart conversion fallback can automatically download and execute an unpinned npm package.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The fallback names sharp-cli without a version and uses npm exec --yes, allowing installation and execution without an interactive approval step. This introduces a supply-chain execution path into an authenticated reporting process, potentially exposing GitLab credentials and repository contents.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The npm fallback can download and execute sharp-cli without disclosing automatic third-party package execution.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

When ImageMagick is absent, this code silently changes a chart-conversion operation into automatic third-party package acquisition and execution. The --yes flag suppresses npm's installation confirmation, so an operator may expose the authenticated process to new executable dependencies without an explicit trust decision.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Unlike the other subprocess calls, npm exec --yes sharp-cli can automatically fetch and execute an unpinned third-party package when the ImageMagick options are unavailable. A compromised resolved package or dependency could run with the script's filesystem access and inherited GitLab credentials.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/update-profile-stats.py (reported line 392)May include surrounding context.

python
return
    npm = shutil.which("npm")
    if npm:
        subprocess.run(
            [
                npm,
                "exec",

Tainted flow: 'svg_output' from os.environ.get (line 457, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/update-profile-stats.py (reported line 392)May include surrounding context.

python
return
    npm = shutil.which("npm")
    if npm:
        subprocess.run(
            [
                npm,
                "exec",