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Security audit

BillClaw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s finance purpose is coherent, but it asks users to connect bank and Gmail data while making overly broad local-only privacy claims.

Review the npm packages and provider permissions before installing. Only configure Plaid, GoCardless, or Gmail credentials if you accept that those providers may process sensitive financial or email-derived data, even if BillClaw stores its own records locally.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (12)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SECURITY.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

md
- ✅ Financial data stored locally in `~/.firela/billclaw/`
- ✅ API calls go directly to Plaid/Gmail (not through our servers)
- ✅ OAuth tokens stored in your system keychain
- ✅ No telemetry, no analytics, no phone-home

### 4. User-Controlled Credentials

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SECURITY.md (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

md
- ✅ Financial data stored locally in `~/.firela/billclaw/`
- ✅ API calls go directly to Plaid/Gmail (not through our servers)
- ✅ OAuth tokens stored in your system keychain
- ✅ No telemetry, no analytics, no phone-home

### 4. User-Controlled Credentials

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SECURITY.md (reported line 155)May include surrounding context.

md
- ✅ Financial data stored locally in `~/.firela/billclaw/`
- ✅ API calls go directly to Plaid/Gmail (not through our servers)
- ✅ OAuth tokens stored in your system keychain
- ✅ No telemetry, no analytics, no phone-home

### 4. User-Controlled Credentials

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SECURITY.md (reported line 178)May include surrounding context.

md
- ✅ Financial data stored locally in `~/.firela/billclaw/`
- ✅ API calls go directly to Plaid/Gmail (not through our servers)
- ✅ OAuth tokens stored in your system keychain
- ✅ No telemetry, no analytics, no phone-home

### 4. User-Controlled Credentials

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SECURITY.md (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

md
- Plaid/Gmail credentials come from YOUR accounts
- Credentials are stored in YOUR system keychain
- BillClaw cannot access credentials without your explicit action
- No shared or embedded credentials

### 5. Explicit User Invocation

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SECURITY.md (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

md
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  │  BillClaw (Local)                                           │   │
│  │  ┌───────────────┐  ┌───────────────┐  ┌────────────────┐  │   │
│  │  │ Local Storage │  │ System Keychain │  │ Config Files  │  │   │
│  │  │ ~/.firela/    │  │ (encrypted)    │  │ ~/.firela/     │  │   │
│  │  └───────────────┘  └───────────────┘  └────────────────┘  │   │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SECURITY.md (reported line 156)May include surrounding context.

md
│  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  │  BillClaw (Local)                                           │   │
│  │  ┌───────────────┐  ┌───────────────┐  ┌────────────────┐  │   │
│  │  │ Local Storage │  │ System Keychain │  │ Config Files  │  │   │
│  │  │ ~/.firela/    │  │ (encrypted)    │  │ ~/.firela/     │  │   │
│  │  └───────────────┘  └───────────────┘  └────────────────┘  │   │
│  └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘   │

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SECURITY.md (reported line 157)May include surrounding context.

Credentials are in system keychain:

macOS: Keychain Access app

Linux: gnome-keyring / kwallet

Windows: Windows Credential Manager

text

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description says this skill manages financial workflows and integrations (bank sync, Gmail bill retrieval, ledger export). However, the actual code does none of those things. It only validates a skill's directory structure and metadata for publication to ClawHub. This is a materially different primary purpose, with entirely different resources and capabilities. Therefore, the description does not accurately represent the supplied code chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

File System Enumeration

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code scans file system directories looking for sensitive files. This could be reconnaissance for credential theft.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SECURITY.md (reported line 153)May include surrounding context.

bash
# All your data is here:
ls -la ~/.firela/billclaw/

# Credentials are in system keychain:
# macOS: Keychain Access app

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill handles especially sensitive financial and email data but does not prominently warn users that enabling bank sync and Gmail fetching sends data to third-party services and requires external credentials. In a finance-context skill, omission of this warning can cause users to underestimate privacy, compliance, and account-security risks before installation or configuration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The file claims financial data 'never leaves your machine' while also advertising Plaid/GoCardless sync and Gmail bill fetching, which necessarily send credentials, metadata, and likely financial/email-derived data to external providers. This can mislead users into granting highly sensitive access under a false privacy assumption, increasing the chance of unintended disclosure of banking and email data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.