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Security audit

Whatsapp Cli

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is rated suspicious because the scanners report administrative and destructive messaging commands beyond the stated scope, and one referenced file was only partially inspected.

Consider the suspicious rating and incomplete coverage before installing. Review the skill's permissions and command list, especially destructive and administrative actions, and ensure you can restrict them or require your approval. The sending guide was not fully inspected, so the scan cannot resolve what it contains.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

md
- [references/sending.md](references/sending.md) · `wa skill show sending` — before a send, reply, edit, deletion,

The command reference exposes destructive and administrative operations beyond the manifest's read, search, send, and link scope.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The reference advertises deleting or clearing chats, blocking contacts, group administration, and changing account privacy settings. These operations alter conversation history, relationships, or account policy rather than implementing the manifest's stated messaging and retrieval tasks; terminal confirmation does not resolve that scope mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/setup.md (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

md
`wa personal mcp serve`. When you can run commands, use the commands instead of MCP.

- MCP uses `wa_tools_search`, then `wa_read` or `wa_write` with `{command, arguments}`, the CLI path such as
  `messages list`. There are no forms and no confirmation form; the profile's `permissions` decide which commands it
  offers, the same as on the command line, and `ask` permits the requested MCP write.
- **An agent never deletes for everyone**, at any level: `messages delete` through MCP is for the owner only (`wa`
  asks WhatsApp to take the messages from the owner's devices; not yet checked on a phone) and has no