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Security audit

GitLab CLI Skills

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because its merge-request review workflow may run contributor-controlled tests with the agent’s permissions, and several parts of the scan were incomplete.

Treat the verdict as a reason to review carefully before installing. The main reported concern is running merge-request-controlled tests with access to agent permissions and credentials; use an approved disposable sandbox without host credentials if reviewing untrusted code. Also note that governance setup may add hooks and periodic sync, and installation or update options may skip prompts. Because parts of the skill and some referenced material were not fully analyzed, the results do not establish that the skill is safe.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (69)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

md
## Multi-agent identity note

When you want different agents to appear as different GitLab users, give each agent its own GitLab bot/service account. Multiple personal access tokens on the same GitLab user still act as that same visible identity.

Use the **Actor identity** for actor-authored GitLab comments, replies, approvals, and other writes. Use an **agent identity** only when the GitLab action is explicitly that agent's own work product. Choose the intended visible actor **before the first GitLab write**.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 111)May include surrounding context.

md
- [`glab-config`](../glab-config/SKILL.md) - CLI configuration and defaults
- [`glab-ssh-key`](../glab-ssh-key/SKILL.md) - SSH key management
- [`glab-gpg-key`](../glab-gpg-key/SKILL.md) - GPG keys for commit signing
- [`glab-token`](../glab-token/SKILL.md) - Personal, project, and group access tokens, including approved self-rotation
- [`glab-deploy-token`](../glab-deploy-token/SKILL.md) - Project/group deploy-token metadata, administrator instance audits, active inventory, approved creation with a protected one-time secret handoff, and approved permanent deletion
- [`glab-todo`](../glab-todo/SKILL.md) - Personal GitLab to-do triage and completion

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 2655)May include surrounding context.

md
Current captured help and immutable provenance: [command reference](references/help-206ebab4f.md). Older [command captures](references/commands.md) retain their original provenance and describe earlier interfaces.

Manage deploy-token metadata and explicitly approved creation or deletion for a project or group. Deploy tokens authenticate with a username/token pair and are separate from personal, project, and group access tokens.

## Instance inventory

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 7042)May include surrounding context.

text

  Create, list, revoke, and rotate access tokens for your user
  account, a project, or a group.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 7052)May include surrounding context.

md
COMMANDS

    create <name> [--flags]                   Creates user, group, or project access tokens.
    list [--flags]                            List user, group, or project access tokens.
    revoke <token-name|token-id> [--flags]    Revoke user, group, or project access tokens.
    rotate [<token-name|token-id>] [--flags]  Rotate user, group, or project access tokens.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 7053)May include surrounding context.

md
COMMANDS

    create <name> [--flags]                   Creates user, group, or project access tokens.
    list [--flags]                            List user, group, or project access tokens.
    revoke <token-name|token-id> [--flags]    Revoke user, group, or project access tokens.
    rotate [<token-name|token-id>] [--flags]  Rotate user, group, or project access tokens.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 7054)May include surrounding context.

md
create <name> [--flags]                   Creates user, group, or project access tokens.
    list [--flags]                            List user, group, or project access tokens.
    revoke <token-name|token-id> [--flags]    Revoke user, group, or project access tokens.
    rotate [<token-name|token-id>] [--flags]  Rotate user, group, or project access tokens.

  FLAGS

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 7055)May include surrounding context.

md
create <name> [--flags]                   Creates user, group, or project access tokens.
    list [--flags]                            List user, group, or project access tokens.
    revoke <token-name|token-id> [--flags]    Revoke user, group, or project access tokens.
    rotate [<token-name|token-id>] [--flags]  Rotate user, group, or project access tokens.

  FLAGS

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

bash
unset GITLAB_TOKEN GITLAB_ACCESS_TOKEN OAUTH_TOKEN GITLAB_HOST
set -a
source ~/.config/openclaw/env/gitlab-<actor>.env
set +a

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1182)May include surrounding context.

bash
unset GITLAB_TOKEN GITLAB_ACCESS_TOKEN OAUTH_TOKEN GITLAB_HOST
set -a
source ~/.config/openclaw/env/gitlab-<actor>.env
set +a

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 2226)May include surrounding context.

bash
set -a
source ~/.config/openclaw/env/gitlab-<agent>.env
set +a

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 91)May include surrounding context.

md
standalone skill in a sibling directory; open its `SKILL.md` for full details.

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 6421)May include surrounding context.

md
`get` writes the requested bundled file to stdout and defaults to `SKILL.md`; it does not install the skill. The `install` command sets up skill bundles for aut

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 6480)May include surrounding context.

md
The path is relative to the skill root and defaults to `SKILL.md`.

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 6515)May include surrounding context.

md
Install bundled `SKILL.md` files to `.agents/skills/`, the

YARA rule 'agent_skill_prompt_injection_hidden_instructions': Prompt injection or hidden instructions embedded in AI agent skill text [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 155)May include surrounding context.

md
mation
- [`glab-check-update`](../glab-check-update/SKILL.md) - Update checker
- [`glab-whatsnew`](../glab-whatsnew/SKILL.md) - Release notes since the last viewed or post-upgrade baseline
- [`glab-changelog`](../glab-changelog/SKILL.md) - Changelog generation
- [`glab-attestation`](../glab-attestation/SKILL.md) - Software supply chain security
- [`glab-duo`](../glab-duo/SKILL.md) - GitLab Duo AI assistant
- [`glab-mcp`](../glab-mcp/SKILL.md) - Migration from the removed glab MCP command; use the [GitLab MCP Server](https://docs.gitlab.com/user/model_context_protocol/mcp_server/) for new integrations
- [`glab-skills`](../glab-skills/SKILL.md) - Inspect bundled skills; install, list, and update bundled or curated remote skills, including the Orbit wrapper skill (EXPERIMENTAL)

## When to use glab vs web UI

**Use glab when:**
- Automating GitLab operations in scripts
- Working in terminal-centric workflows
- Batch operations (multiple MRs/issues)
- Integration with other CLI tools
- CI/

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 794)May include surrounding context.

md
# glab artifact-registry

Exchange the active GitLab credential for a short-lived Artifact Registry access token. The command group also accepts the `glab ar` alias. This command group is experimental; verify live help and the target GitLab instance before using it in durable automation.

## Maven and sbt destination files

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1159)May include surrounding context.

md
Keep token files outside version control and do not print their contents.

**CI auto-login:** `GLAB_ENABLE_CI_AUTOLOGIN=true` lets glab use `CI_JOB_TOKEN` in GitLab CI/CD without a stored login. `GITLAB_TOKEN`, `GITLAB_ACCESS_TOKEN`, and `OAUTH_TOKEN` still take precedence, so leave them unset when the intended credential is `CI_JOB_TOKEN`. Use explicit env tokens instead when a command needs a project, group, or personal access token.

### Agentic and multi-account setups

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1281)May include surrounding context.

md
**Env-token auth failures:**
- If `GITLAB_TOKEN`, `GITLAB_ACCESS_TOKEN`, or `OAUTH_TOKEN` is exported, it overrides stored credentials only for trusted hosts (see above).
- `GITLAB_TOKEN` and `GITLAB_ACCESS_TOKEN` are treated as personal access tokens independently of a stored OAuth profile, so a temporary PAT does not inherit or refresh saved OAuth state.
- If the host is configured for OAuth but an environment variable contains an OAuth access token, set `GLAB_IS_OAUTH2=true`; otherwise glab sends the environment token as a personal access token. `glab auth status` reports this scheme mismatch after a 401.
- If auth suddenly fails, check whether an env token is being picked up before assuming your saved login is broken. `glab auth login` and `glab auth status` warn when this precedence applies.
- Run `type glab` to distinguish a wrapper that intentionally injects a token (for example, a 1Password shell plugin alias) from a plain executable path. A wrapper can be expected and need no

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1281)May include surrounding context.

md
_TOKEN`, `GITLAB_ACCESS_TOKEN`, or `OAUTH_TOKEN` is exported, it overrides stored credentials only for trusted hosts (see above).
- `GITLAB_TOKEN` and `GITLAB_ACCESS_TOKEN` are treated as personal access tokens independently of a stored OAuth profile, so a temporary PAT does not inherit or refresh saved OAuth state.
- If the host is configured for OAuth but an environment variable contains an OAuth access token, set `GLAB_IS_OAUTH2=true`; otherwise glab sends the environment token as a personal access token. `glab auth status` reports this scheme mismatch after a 401.
- If auth suddenly fails, check whether an env token is being picked up before assuming your saved login is broken. `glab auth login` and `glab auth status` warn when this precedence applies.
- Run `type glab` to distinguish a wrapper that intentionally injects a token (for example, a 1Password shell plugin alias) from a plain executable path. A wrapper can be expected and need no action; a plain path means the token came

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 5261)May include surrounding context.

--ref "$CI_COMMIT_SHA"

text

The Milestones API does not accept `CI_JOB_TOKEN`, even when that token can create a release. Use `--no-close-milestone` when milestone closure is outside the approved job scope, or an approved project/group access token with `api` scope when closure is required. A 401/403 during milestone closure with a resolved job token adds this explanation; other errors or token kinds do not get that hint. Milestone-close errors are logged without making this step fail the release command. Release creation or asset uploads may already have succeeded, so a successful exit does not prove milestone closure; inspect both states before retrying.

Do not assign `CI_JOB_TOKEN` to `GITLAB_TOKEN`: glab sends `GITLAB_TOKEN` as `PRIVATE-TOKEN`, which the Releases API rejects for a job token and can surface as `404 Not Found`. When job-token access is insufficient, use an approved project or group access token with `api` scope through `GITLAB_TOKEN`; never print that token.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 5263)May include surrounding context.

md
The Milestones API does not accept `CI_JOB_TOKEN`, even when that token can create a release. Use `--no-close-milestone` when milestone closure is outside the approved job scope, or an approved project/group access token with `api` scope when closure is required. A 401/403 during milestone closure with a resolved job token adds this explanation; other errors or token kinds do not get that hint. Milestone-close errors are logged without making this step fail the release command. Release creation or asset uploads may already have succeeded, so a successful exit does not prove milestone closure; inspect both states before retrying.

Do not assign `CI_JOB_TOKEN` to `GITLAB_TOKEN`: glab sends `GITLAB_TOKEN` as `PRIVATE-TOKEN`, which the Releases API rejects for a job token and can surface as `404 Not Found`. When job-token access is insufficient, use an approved project or group access token with `api` scope through `GITLAB_TOKEN`; never print that token.

## Subcommands

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 7023)May include surrounding context.

md
## Rotate the current credential

`glab token rotate --self` (alias `rot`) rotates the access token currently authenticating the selected host. It requires GitLab 17.9 or later and a token allowed to use the self-rotation endpoint. Confirm the host, visible actor, credential source, and every client sharing that token before approving rotation. The old secret stops working immediately; this is an operational credential write, not an authentication test.

Do not pass a token name/ID, `--user`, or `--group` with `--self`. Without `--self`, a token name/ID is required. Repository context can select the host; outside a checkout, the default host applies. Use an explicit trusted host context rather than assuming the current token belongs to the intended instance.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 864)May include surrounding context.

md
- `--docker` installs the `docker-credential-glab` shim and registers `glab` under Docker's per-registry `credHelpers`.
- `--maven` writes a `<server>` block to `~/.m2/settings.xml`, keyed by `--registry-alias`; the consuming `<repository>` must use the same `<id>`.
- `--gradle` writes `{alias}Url`, `{alias}Username`, and `{alias}Password` to `~/.gradle/gradle.properties`, where `{alias}` is `--registry-alias`.
- `--npm` writes a `//{host}{path}/:_authToken` entry to `~/.npmrc`; you must still configure `registry=` or `@scope:registry=` to point npm at the registry.
- `--yarn` configures Yarn 2 or later in `~/.yarnrc.yml`: an `npmRegistries` entry holds `npmAuthToken` and `npmAlwaysAuth`. Set a matching `npmRegistryServer` separately. For Yarn 1 use `--npm`. Existing `npmScopes` credentials can override the registry token; inspect the warning and review the scope before changing it. Rewriting YAML can change formatting.
- `--sbt` writes credentials for both sbt 1.x and 2.x; see [destin

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 894)May include surrounding context.

md
ue`. Maven, Gradle, npm, Yarn, and sbt login paths can read `GITLAB_TOKEN` because `glab` writes the exchanged token into each tool's config file.
- Use this only for a registry actually backed by GitLab Artifact Registry. Misclassifying a normal container registry can make every pull fail because an exchanged Artifact Registry token takes precedence.
- Review the destination config path before writing: `${DOCKER_CONFIG:-$HOME/.docker}/config.json`, `~/.m2/settings.xml`, `~/.gradle/gradle.properties`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.yarnrc.yml`, or the sbt destination files listed above (or the explicit `--config-file`).
- `--registry-alias` applies only to Maven and Gradle. For Gradle, choose an alias that is a valid identifier in the build script; the derived default can contain hyphens.
- Re-running the command for the same registry refreshes or replaces the matching entry. After configuration, test a non-destructive package-manager operation against the intended host without printing credentials.