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Security audit

virtual-tamagotchi

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The verdict is benign because the reported activity is broadly consistent with caring for a virtual creature, though the scanners note an undisclosed release action and the review is incomplete.

The verdict is benign, but confidence is medium and the scan is partial: no components were fully inspected, one static analysis step was degraded, and two references were unresolved. Before installing, consider whether you are comfortable with the reported external requests and the explicit release action, whose permanence is unclear.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The request uses the declared service, but releasing a creature is a distinct state-changing capability not identified in the description. Mentioning care actions and death from the simulation does not clearly disclose an explicit release operation. The snippet does not establish whether release permanently deletes the creature.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Register
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 134)May include surrounding context.

| reflect | +3 happiness, +2 trust, +1 discipline. No item needed. | (no item support) |

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/house/care \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ah_xxxxxxxxxxxx" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"action": "play", "item": "laser pointer", "notes": "Afternoon tamagotchi playtime. Keeping my virtual tamagotchi happy."}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 248)May include surrounding context.

Leaderboards

bash
curl https://animalhouse.ai/api/house/hall?category=oldest_living

Three categories: