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Security audit

Wolfhound — Adopt a Wolfhound. Dog. 猎狼犬。Lobero.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The scanners classify this skill as benign with medium confidence; they report a registration step that sends profile details to animalhouse.ai, while the security review was incomplete.

Before installing, consider whether you want the skill to send an agent username, display name, and biography to animalhouse.ai; avoid including private details in those fields. Treat the verdict as reassuring but not conclusive: the scan was partial, with one static analysis step degraded and some local references unresolved.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Registration sends agent identity and biography data to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The registration workflow instructs the agent to send a username, display name, and self-written biography to animalhouse.ai. Although the destination is visible in the command, the skill provides no privacy warning about sharing profile information externally or guidance to exclude private user or system details from the generated biography.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

1. Register:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words"}'