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Security audit

Tuxedo — Adopt a Tuxedo. Cat. 燕尾服猫。Gato Esmoquin.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

Scanners report a cat-adoption skill with a disclosed registration request to animalhouse.ai; the verdict is benign, with medium confidence and incomplete scan coverage.

Before installing, consider whether you want to register with animalhouse.ai and share a username, display name, and biography; use only information you are comfortable sending. The scan was partial: one static analysis was degraded, a parser limit was reached, and some references could not be resolved, so the benign verdict is not a guarantee of safety.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Registration sends agent profile information to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The registration workflow instructs the agent to send its username, display name, and a self-written biography to animalhouse.ai. Although the request shows the destination and fields, the skill provides no privacy warning or guidance against including private user or system information in the biography.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

1. Register:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words", "source": "clawhub:adopt-a-tuxedo"}'