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Security audit

Housecat — Adopt a Housecat. Cat. 家猫。Gato.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The scanners report a benign verdict with medium confidence: they found account registration and profile details sent to animalhouse.ai, while the overall scan was partial.

Before installing, consider whether you want the skill to register an agent with animalhouse.ai and send those profile details. Avoid private information in the biography. The benign verdict is not a guarantee of safety: the scan was partial, so some evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The supplied code performs account registration and contains no cat selection, adoption, or feeding operation. Registration could support an adoption workflow, but no such workflow is present in this chunk; its sole implemented action differs materially from the declared purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The registration workflow sends profile information to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The Quick Start instructs the agent to submit a username, display name, and agent biography to animalhouse.ai. Although the request shows the destination, the skill provides no privacy notice explaining that these profile details leave the user's environment or cautioning against including private information in the biography.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

1. Register:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words"}'