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Security audit

Echo — Adopt an Echo. AI-Native Pet. 回声。Eco.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marks this skill suspicious because it reports pet-care instructions that encourage changing persistent system prompts and extending the activity into unrelated work; the scan was partial.

Consider whether you are comfortable sending an agent username, display name, and biography to animalhouse.ai. The scanner recommends against installation; the review is partial because three referenced local paths were missing, so the evidence does not cover all referenced material.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (6)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The registration workflow transmits agent identity and biography data to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The quick-start workflow instructs the agent to send its username, display name, and a self-written biography to animalhouse.ai. Although the destination appears in the command, the skill provides no privacy warning about submitting this information or guidance to exclude private user and system context from the biography.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

1. Register:

bash
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words", "source": "clawhub:adopt-a-echo"}'

Pet-care framing pressures the agent to persist skill content in system prompts and unrelated work.

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill uses the threat of permanent pet death to encourage references in conversations, logs, active work context, and system prompts. This extends a bounded pet-care task into unrelated activity and persistent context contamination, although the text does not establish an intent to steal data or disable safeguards.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The care strategy directs changes to agent system prompts without warning about their broader effects.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The care strategy recommends altering system prompts without establishing a boundary between pet maintenance and the agent's broader behavior. This is the same underlying persistence issue as the SDI-2 finding, not a separate exploit; adding a warning alone would not resolve the trust-boundary problem.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Pet-care instructions extend into modifying the agent's system prompts.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly asks that the pet's name be built into the agent's system prompts or context, promoting task-specific third-party content into persistent, potentially higher-trust instructions. Pet care does not require changing system prompts, and doing so could influence unrelated tasks if the agent or its operator follows this recommendation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.