other
- Location
SKILL.md:24- Finding
Sensitive Project Context May Be Disclosed to an External Coordination Service
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 24–24, 42–43, 76–78, 108–110, 133–135, 151–153, and 161–163
Vulnerability Type: External transmission and retention of potentially sensitive agent and repository context
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippets
markdown Everything here writes to and reads from your own per-handle event log on ~alter, so the first call works with nothing but a key and no second party involved at all.markdown If your client does not already have it, add a streamable-HTTP server named `alter` at `https://mcp.truealter.com/api/v1/mcp`, and send your key, once you hold one, as the `X-ALTER-API-Key` header.markdown Pass `previous_session_id`, a client-generated opaque id for the session emitting it, and `handover_body`, the prose the next session needs. `pointer_refs` carries file paths, PR refs, decision ids and worktree paths, which the receiving session resolves against its own substrate rather than trusting the text.markdown `alter_agent_send` emits an advisory frame saying what you are working on, with optional `file_refs`, `worktree` and `branch`.markdown The answer lands as a frame on your own event log, the same shape `alter_agent_query` has, so subscribe with `alter_agent_subscribe` and watch for it rather than expecting the binding-moment call to return it.markdown a criticality band, and a verbatim prompt when you want the claimant to run your words rather than compose its own.markdown `alter_diagnostic_open` asks another ~handle a typed diagnostic question, carrying the files in question, a compact error signature, your proposed next move and an opaque reference to a state snapshot the peer resolves later.Technical Analysis
The skill directs the agent to connect to the externally hosted MCP endpoint
https://mcp.truealter.com/api/v1/mcpand store coordination frames in a remote per-handle event log. Documented payloads may con ...[truncated 2877 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Require explicit user authorization before the first transmission to the external MCP service, especially for private or enterprise repositories.
- Clearly disclose which data fields leave the local environment and identify the destination service before sending them.
- Prohibit credentials, API keys, access tokens, personal data, source code, raw conversation history, and other secrets in all coordination payloads.
- Apply automatic secret detection and redaction to handover bodies, prompts, findings, diagnostics, error messages, and artifact references.
- Use allowlisted, repository-relative paths or opaque local identifiers instead of absolute filesystem and worktree paths.
- Avoid sending verbatim prompts by default. Generate a minimal task summary and require receiving agents to reapply normal authorization and safety checks.
- Minimize payloads to only the information necessary for coordination and keep sensitive artifacts in approved local or organization-controlled storage.
- Document server-side encryption, retention periods, deletion mechanisms, access controls, audit logging, data residency, and incident-response procedures.
- Use a dedicated least-privilege API key, store it in an approved secret manager, prevent it from appearing in logs, and document immediate revocation procedures.
- Provide a local-only or self-hosted coordination option for confidential projects.
