T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:17- Finding
Excessive Tool Permissions for a Log-Sanitization Skill
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 17–20
Vulnerability Type: Excessive filesystem and command-execution permissions
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml tools: - read - exec - writeTechnical Analysis
The skill declares general
read,write, andexeccapabilities even though its documented purpose is to sanitize supplied log content. Command execution is not inherently required for text sanitization, while unrestricted filesystem access is broader than necessary when content can be passed directly to the skill.The project contains only documentation and does not define command allowlists, permitted filesystem paths, write confirmations, or sandbox controls. Consequently, security depends entirely on controls implemented by the host agent. If the agent grants these tools without strict mediation, untrusted log content or embedded instructions could influence the agent into invoking commands or accessing files unrelated to sanitization.
No explicit malicious command, credential-exfiltration routine, persistence mechanism, or remote payload was found. Exploitation is therefore conditional on the host agent granting the declared permissions and inadequately separating untrusted data from executable instructions.
Attack Path
- A host agent loads the skill and grants its declared
read,write, andexectools. - An attacker submits crafted log content containing instructions or data intended to influence tool use.
- If the host agent treats that content as actionable instructions rather than untrusted data, it may invoke
execor access arbitrary filesystem paths. - The resulting tool calls could read sensitive local files, modify files available to the agent, or execute commands with the agent process's operating-system privileges.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide access to files readable or writable by the agent proce ...[truncated 499 chars]
- A host agent loads the skill and grants its declared
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
execbecause command execution is not necessary for log-text sanitization. - Process content supplied directly by the user without filesystem access whenever possible.
- If file processing is required, restrict
readandwriteto explicit user-selected paths within a dedicated sandbox directory. - Require user confirmation before overwriting or creating files.
- Treat all log content as untrusted data and prevent it from being interpreted as agent instructions.
- Enforce file-size, input-format, path-traversal, and symbolic-link checks before processing files.
- Document the exact tool operations required by the skill and apply a deny-by-default command and path policy.
- Run the skill under a minimally privileged operating-system identity with no access to credentials, sensitive configuration, or unrelated project files.
- Remove
