T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/generate_image.py:3- Finding
Unpinned Dependencies Permit Unreviewed Supply-Chain Changes
- Content
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=3.10" # dependencies = [ # "google-genai>=1.0.0", # "pillow>=10.0.0", # ] # /// ``` ### Technical Analysis The script declares dependencies using open-ended minimum-version constraints. When the documented `uv run` workflow resolves these dependencies, it may install any future release matching the constraints. Consequently, the code executed by the Skill can change without a corresponding change to, or security review of, the Skill package. No malicious dependency is currently identified in the audited files. The risk arises from mutable supply-chain resolution: compromise of an upstream package or publication of a malicious future version could introduce arbitrary code into the execution environment. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the release process or maintainer account of an allowed dependency, or otherwise causes a malicious satisfying version to be published. 2. A user invokes the script through the documented `uv run` workflow. 3. Dependency resolution selects and installs the malicious or compromised release because no exact version or reviewed lockfile prevents it. 4. Package-controlled code executes during installation, import, or normal API use. 5. The payload runs with the same operating-system privileges and environment access as the Agent process. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the Agent user's account. Depending on local permissions, the payload could access the Gemini API key, user prompts, input images, generated output, and other files readable or writable by that account. It could also make network requests or alter user-owned files. This issue does not itself grant administrative privileges; its scope is bounded by ...[truncated 54 chars]- Remediation
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