T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:21- Finding
Unpinned packages and mutable sources are executed during installation
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill has a legitimate avatar-management purpose, but it uses unsafe shell templates, unrestricted URL downloads, and plaintext API-key persistence that users should review before installing.
Review this skill before installing. Use a direct local image when possible, avoid pasting sensitive descriptions or private URLs, do not store a valuable API key in TOOLS.md unless you accept plaintext storage, and prefer pinned install sources. The skill should validate agent names, agent IDs, filenames, and URLs before any curl or openclaw command is run.
README.md:21Unpinned packages and mutable sources are executed during installation
SKILL.md:112Shell command injection through unvalidated identity-derived values
SKILL.md:105Unrestricted image URL retrieval permits SSRF and unsafe local resource access
SKILL.md:32Freepik API key is persistently stored in a plaintext workspace file
The README instructs users to execute an unpinned package via npx, which fetches and runs whatever version is current at install time. If the package is compromised, updated maliciously, or a dependency is hijacked, users could execute attacker-controlled code during installation.
The clawhub install command is also unpinned, so users are directed to run a remote package manager command without version locking. This creates a supply-chain risk because future package changes or account compromise could alter what gets executed on user systems.
The README says a pasted Freepik API key will be auto-saved to TOOLS.md for future use, but it does not clearly warn users that this persists a secret to a workspace file. Storing credentials in plaintext documentation-style files can lead to accidental disclosure through source control, file sharing, backups, or other tools that read workspace content.
The skill description says it auto-saves to the workspace and updates IDENTITY.md, but it does not present this as a user-facing warning or require explicit confirmation before making persistent configuration changes. This can surprise users and lead to unintended modification of agent identity state.
The trigger phrases are very broad and include common requests like 'change avatar', which can cause the skill to activate in contexts where the user did not clearly consent to file writes, identity changes, or external API use. Because the skill performs persistent modifications and may contact third-party services, overly loose activation increases the chance of unintended execution.
The description does not clearly warn users that style descriptions are sent to Freepik during search mode and that remote image URLs may be fetched from third parties. This creates a privacy and data-handling risk because user input and network metadata may be disclosed externally without sufficiently explicit notice.
The skill sends constructed search queries to Freepik and uses an API key read from local configuration, creating clear external data transmission. If user descriptions contain sensitive details, those details are disclosed to a third party; additionally, the skill encourages automatic network access without an explicit consent gate tied to the transmission step.
curl -s "https://api.freepik.com/v1/resources?locale=en&page=1&limit=10&order=relevance&term={QUERY}&filters%5Bcontent_type%5D%5Bvector%5D=1&filters%5Blicense%5D%5Bfree%5D=1" \
-H "x-freepik-api-key: {API_KEY}" \
-H "Accept: application/json"
The skill persists downloaded content into the user's workspace and then updates agent identity to reference it, making the change durable across sessions. Persistent writes are not inherently unsafe, but here they increase risk because remote content is saved locally and becomes part of ongoing agent configuration, potentially without strong validation or clear consent.
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/workspace/avatars
curl -sL -o ~/.openclaw/workspace/avatars/{FILENAME} "{CHOSEN_URL}"
The instructions state that IDENTITY.md info and the user's description should be translated to English for search construction. This imposes a language choice automatically rather than offering the user a choice or explaining the constraint as a user-visible, justified locale requirement.