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Security audit

Openclaw Channel Dingtalk

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a real DingTalk connector, but it needs review because it can automatically send local files and persist behavior-changing rules.

Install only in an environment where you trust the plugin publisher and the configured DingTalk owners. Prefer allowlist or pairing policies instead of open access, set commands.ownerAllowFrom tightly, avoid enabling debug or learning unless needed, review persisted state retention, use env/file secret references with restrictive permissions, and update/verify dependencies before production use.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

SkillSpector was not run because this plugin release contains no bundled skills.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this plugin as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.env_credential_access, suspicious.exposed_secret_literal, suspicious.potential_exfiltration

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
dist/index.js:90
Evidence
return Boolean(process.env[value.id]?.trim());

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
dist/index.js.map:4
Evidence
"sourcesContent": ["import { defineChannelPluginEntry, type OpenClawPluginApi } from \"openclaw/plugin-sdk/core\";\nimport { readStringParam } from \"openclaw/p...

Sensitive-looking file read is paired with a network send.

Warn
Code
suspicious.potential_exfiltration
Location
dist/index.js:1746
Evidence
const raw = readFileSync(sessionsPath, "utf-8");