Environment variable access combined with network send.
- Code
- suspicious.env_credential_access
- Location
- dist/index.js:90
- Evidence
return Boolean(process.env[value.id]?.trim());
Security audit
Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk
This appears to be a real DingTalk connector, but it needs review because it can automatically send local files and persist behavior-changing rules.
Install only in an environment where you trust the plugin publisher and the configured DingTalk owners. Prefer allowlist or pairing policies instead of open access, set commands.ownerAllowFrom tightly, avoid enabling debug or learning unless needed, review persisted state retention, use env/file secret references with restrictive permissions, and update/verify dependencies before production use.
SkillSpector was not run because this plugin release contains no bundled skills.
65/65 vendors flagged this plugin as clean.
Detected: suspicious.env_credential_access, suspicious.exposed_secret_literal, suspicious.potential_exfiltration
return Boolean(process.env[value.id]?.trim());
"sourcesContent": ["import { defineChannelPluginEntry, type OpenClawPluginApi } from \"openclaw/plugin-sdk/core\";\nimport { readStringParam } from \"openclaw/p...const raw = readFileSync(sessionsPath, "utf-8");