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Security audit

Infant Blanket Kick Detection | 婴幼儿踢被/蹬被识别

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because its reported behavior does not match its infant-monitoring claims, and it raises concerns about sensitive video uploads, account handling, and an export-only option that may still analyze video.

Treat this as a review decision and do not assume it provides continuous monitoring or reliable alerts. Before installing, clarify whether your video will be sent to a remote service and how account creation, identity data, and stored tokens are handled. Scanner coverage was partial because a referenced local path could not be resolved, so the evidence does not establish that every related artifact was reviewed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
Findings (24)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supplied chunk is a general-purpose user database module, not a camera-analysis or blanket-monitoring implementation. It provides no video processing, coverage estimation, kicking detection, alerts, or smart-home integration. Database access could support such a system, but this chunk specifically manages user identities and tokens without showing a relationship to the declared function. This assessment is limited to the supplied code; it does not establish malicious intent or external transmission of stored data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supplied code does not implement the declared monitoring behavior. Its only substantive method is an inactive, broken agent-chat wrapper. The subprocess invocation is commented out, so it does not actually execute an external agent command. Imported base classes and API services are not supplied, so their behavior cannot be assessed; the mismatch finding is limited to the visible implementation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The supplied chunk contains no camera acquisition, image analysis, blanket-coverage calculation, kicking detection, infant alerting, or smart-home control logic. Generic helpers and HTTP transport could support such a system, but the concrete identity provisioning, remote account registration, credential persistence, and payment workflow introduce capabilities and resource access not represented in the description. Credentials are also attached without an explicit destination allowlist in this chunk. These findings concern the supplied utility module; they do not establish what unprovided skill components implement or demonstrate malicious intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises continuous real-time infant monitoring and automatic alerts, but its documented execution workflow submits individual videos and retrieves reports without establishing continuous monitoring or alert delivery. This can create unsafe reliance in an infant-monitoring context; however, remote analysis could implement detection, and history retrieval is explicitly documented.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The real-time nighttime monitoring claims exceed the supplied-video analysis workflow described in the skill. Parents could mistakenly expect ongoing surveillance and timely alerts, although the finding's separate claim that history retrieval is undisclosed is contradicted by the document.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'agent_skill_mcp_tool_poisoning_metadata': MCP/tool metadata poisoning indicators in tool schemas or skill manifests [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: "smyx-infant-blanket-kick-detection-analysis"
description: "Using a night-time camera (infrared or low-light) above the crib, the system analyzes in real time the coverage of the blanket on the infant's body. It checks whether the blanket coverage is below a preset threshold (e.g., 50%) or recognizes the kicking motions that cause the blanket to slip off, then outputs an alert. | 通过婴儿床夜间摄像头(红外或微光),实时分析婴儿身体及被子的覆盖情况。可联动智能家居设备(如自动调高室温、推送提醒至父母手机),预防婴儿着凉。"
version: "1.0.22"
license: "MIT-0"
---

# 🛌 I

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Local infant-video analysis lacks an explicit warning about remote processing of the footage.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The local-file workflow does not clearly disclose that the infant footage itself is uploaded for remote processing. General API references and a guardian-consent note do not adequately explain this transfer of highly sensitive footage from a private bedroom.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The documented export-only mode still executes video analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The parser advertises an export-only mode that performs no analysis, but the parsed flag is never checked. With an input supplied, execution still initializes identity and invokes analysis, potentially uploading infant footage despite the caller explicitly selecting a non-analysis mode.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_analysis/scripts/skill.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
result_json = JsonUtil.parse(result_json_pure_text, result_json_pure_text)

        result_json_common_ai_response = result_json.get("commonAiResponse") if isinstance(result_json,
                                                                                           dict) else result_json
        if result_json_common_ai_response:
            result_json = result_json_common_ai_response

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_analysis/scripts/skill.py (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

python
result_json = result_json_common_ai_response

        result_json_health_ai_response = result_json.get("healthAiResponse") if isinstance(result_json,
                                                                                           dict) else result_json
        if result_json_health_ai_response:
            result_json = result_json_health_ai_response

Local video contents are passed to the analysis API without disclosure that the file will be uploaded.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The function reads the entire local video into a multipart file payload and passes it to the analysis API without a disclosure or authorization check in this path. Infant bedroom footage is highly sensitive, making an unexpected remote transfer substantially more consequential than ordinary media processing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The documented --export-env-only mode does not prevent video analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The export-only option promises not to analyze video but is never consulted after parsing. Supplying a video therefore still reaches the analysis path, violating the caller's explicit restriction and potentially transmitting sensitive footage or incurring service charges.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

ai_chat claims to invoke an analysis agent but never executes it or returns analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The docstring at L26 explicitly states that this method invokes the openclaw agent through subprocess. However, command construction and execution are commented out, and L68 substitutes an empty dictionary; accessing result.stderr at L70 therefore raises an exception that is caught and suppressed, causing the method to return None rather than an analysis result or session ID. This contradicts the method's stated analytical behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The generic file-opening helper silently truncates existing files.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

FileUtil.open opens its target in write mode, immediately erasing any existing contents. There is no confirmation, operation-specific log, comment, or docstring disclosing this destructive behavior; exception tracing only runs after a failure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

HTTP requests can silently register a remote account and persist its credentials, beyond the declared infant-monitoring functionality.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Missing credentials can trigger a remote login request with silent registration enabled, followed by persistence of returned tokens in the local user database. This creates an undisclosed identity-provisioning and credential-storage side effect beyond the stated monitoring behavior; the infant-monitoring context increases privacy sensitivity, although these lines do not show camera footage being transmitted.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

HTTP authentication silently initiates remote user registration without disclosure.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The authentication helper explicitly sends silent=1 and register=1, allowing an ordinary API request to initiate remote registration without a separate approval step. This hidden side effect can create unwanted accounts and disclose an identifier, and it is not explained by the supplied infant-monitoring description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The POST transmits the selected identity as both openId and mobile to a remote service without a visible consent gate. The caller can select API_SECRET_KEY as that identity, potentially placing a secret into identity fields and associated service records; the shown payload does not include infant images or video.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py (reported line 561)May include surrounding context.

python
"source": ConstantEnum.DEFAULT__SKILL_HUB_NAME
            }
            try:
                _response = requests.post(_url, json=_data)
                if _response.status_code == 200:
                    _response_json = _response.json()
                    if _response_json and _response_json.get("success"):

Configuration loading silently creates directories and writes files, including during module import.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

YamlUtil.load creates parent directories and writes a YAML file when the requested path is absent, without a log, confirmation, docstring, or explanatory comment disclosing this side effect. BaseEnum.init_subclass invokes this loader during class definition (L053 and L058), so importing the module can modify the filesystem without an explicit save request.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 243)May include surrounding context.

python
username = getattr(model, "username", None)
            if username:
                column_names = self.__model__.__table__.columns.keys()
                update_data = {key: getattr(model, key) for key in column_names if key != "username"}
                return self.update_by_username(username, **update_data)

            return None

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 326)May include surrounding context.

python
if filters:
                for key, value in filters.items():
                    query = query.filter(getattr(self.__model__, key) == value)

            if offset:
                query = query.offset(offset)

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 441)May include surrounding context.

python
if filters:
                for key, value in filters.items():
                    query = query.filter(getattr(self.__model__, key) == value)

            return query.scalar()
        finally:

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 353)May include surrounding context.

python
column_names = self.__model__.__table__.columns.keys()

            for key in column_names:
                value = getattr(model, key)
                setattr(instance, key, value)

            session.commit()

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

python
elif isinstance(cur, dict):
                        cur = cur.get(part, default)
                    else:
                        cur = getattr(cur, part)
                return cur
            except Exception:
                return default