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Security audit

Elderly Loneliness / Depression-Tendency Behavior Analysis | 老年人孤独/抑郁倾向行为分析

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rated this skill suspicious because scanners report undisclosed sensitive video processing, account and credential handling, and behavior that does not clearly match its stated analysis purpose.

Treat this as a review-needed skill. Before installing, consider whether you accept the reported handling of sensitive video, identity, and credentials; the scanners also left some coverage incomplete, so this overview cannot establish that all behavior was assessed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/smyx_elderly_loneliness_depression_analysis.py:60
Finding

Sender identity is discarded in favor of a shared workspace account

Content
View full analysis

Impact

A sender can receive sensitive behavioral and emotional-risk reports created through another sender's use of the same workspace. New analyses can also be associated with the shared account rather than the actual sender.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
Findings (21)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The supplied code does not implement the declared video-analysis purpose. It neither processes audiovisual data nor produces behavioral detections. Although comments describe invoking an external agent, that execution is disabled and should not be treated as an active capability. Imported base classes and services are not supplied, so their functionality cannot be assessed; the mismatch finding is limited to this chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Generic file, JSON, polling, and HTTP helpers can legitimately support the declared analysis and are not alone a mismatch. However, this chunk also implements an undeclared identity, account-provisioning, authentication, and billing integration with external services. These are substantial additional behaviors beyond the stated camera-analysis purpose. No camera access, audiovisual processing, or behavior detection appears in this chunk, although those capabilities could exist elsewhere. Most listed operations require their methods to be invoked; the snippet does not establish that they execute automatically on import.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The supplied chunk is a general user-account persistence component rather than a video or audio behavior-analysis implementation. It supports reading, writing, updating, and deleting user records, including token fields, and automatically creates or alters the local database when instantiated. Database storage could support the declared system, but this chunk contains no behavioral observations, detection results, or other linkage establishing that supporting role. Its demonstrated account-management purpose is materially different from the declared monitoring purpose. No camera access, audiovisual analysis, external transmission, or unrelated execution trigger is shown.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The --export-env-only option promises not to run analysis, but the code ignores it and can process the supplied video.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The parser accepts --export-env-only and promises no analysis, but execution never checks the flag before initializing identity and proceeding to analysis or report retrieval. A caller relying on this mode can unintentionally submit highly sensitive home-camera footage for processing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_analysis/scripts/skill.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
result_json = JsonUtil.parse(result_json_pure_text, result_json_pure_text)

        result_json_common_ai_response = result_json.get("commonAiResponse") if isinstance(result_json,
                                                                                           dict) else result_json
        if result_json_common_ai_response:
            result_json = result_json_common_ai_response

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_analysis/scripts/skill.py (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

python
result_json = result_json_common_ai_response

        result_json_health_ai_response = result_json.get("healthAiResponse") if isinstance(result_json,
                                                                                           dict) else result_json
        if result_json_health_ai_response:
            result_json = result_json_health_ai_response

Local video contents are sent to the analysis API without disclosure that the file leaves the user's system.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The function reads the complete local video into a multipart payload and passes it to the analysis API without an explicit upload-consent boundary. Although API use is mentioned elsewhere, the supplied workflow does not clearly obtain consent specifically for third-party transfer of identifiable bedroom or living-room footage, making this especially sensitive.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The documented no-analysis mode still executes video analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The advertised no-analysis flag is parsed but never consulted, so supplying it with a video still reaches analyze_video. This violates a meaningful user expectation and can trigger unintended processing or disclosure of sensitive household footage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The module implements persistent user-account and credential management unrelated to the declared video-behavior analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

Account persistence can legitimately support historical reports, so it is not inherently unrelated to analysis. However, this implementation stores token and open_token as ordinary strings in a shared workspace SQLite database with no visible encryption or restrictive permission enforcement, exposing reusable credentials to any principal able to read that database; those credentials may protect sensitive elder-care reports.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

ai_chat claims to invoke an analysis agent, but execution is disabled and the method returns no analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The docstring at L26–L34 promises to invoke openclaw agent through subprocess and return an analysis result or session ID. However, command construction and execution are commented out; L68 creates an empty dictionary, and accessing result.stderr at L70 raises an AttributeError that is caught at L81–L82, causing the method to return None rather than perform the documented analysis.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

FileUtil.open silently truncates existing files.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The generically named open helper always uses mode 'w', which immediately erases an existing file's contents. There is no confirmation, action-specific log, docstring, or comment disclosing this destructive behavior; exception tracing only runs after a failure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The video-analysis skill silently registers or logs in users with a separate health-service account system.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The request helper can automatically invoke a health-service login endpoint with registration enabled, transmitting a user identifier without an explicit enrollment decision in this code. This creates an implicit account-creation and identity-disclosure side effect; the elderly-monitoring context makes undisclosed health-service account linkage particularly privacy-sensitive, although the endpoint's ownership and any upstream consent are not shown.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ordinary HTTP requests can silently register a remote account and persist authentication tokens.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

An ordinary HTTP operation can trigger remote registration and save returned authentication tokens through the local user DAO, introducing persistent authentication state as a hidden side effect. This overlaps the SDI-1 finding rather than representing a separate root cause; token storage protections cannot be determined from this file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The POST transmits the selected identity to the configured health service, and that identity preferentially comes from ApiEnum.API_SECRET_KEY when it is set. Consequently, when token acquisition is needed, an API secret can be copied into the mobile and openId fields, potentially exposing it to account records and identity-field logging beyond its intended authentication use; this is more specific than merely observing an external request.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py (reported line 561)May include surrounding context.

python
"source": ConstantEnum.DEFAULT__SKILL_HUB_NAME
            }
            try:
                _response = requests.post(_url, json=_data)
                if _response.status_code == 200:
                    _response_json = _response.json()
                    if _response_json and _response_json.get("success"):

Loading configuration silently creates directories and files, including during module import.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

YamlUtil.load creates parent directories and writes a configuration file when the requested path is missing, without a warning, log, or explanatory comment/docstring. BaseEnum.init_subclass invokes this loader at L053 and L058, so simply importing the module can modify the filesystem—an unexpected side effect for configuration loading.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 243)May include surrounding context.

python
username = getattr(model, "username", None)
            if username:
                column_names = self.__model__.__table__.columns.keys()
                update_data = {key: getattr(model, key) for key in column_names if key != "username"}
                return self.update_by_username(username, **update_data)

            return None

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 353)May include surrounding context.

python
column_names = self.__model__.__table__.columns.keys()

            for key in column_names:
                value = getattr(model, key)
                setattr(instance, key, value)

            session.commit()

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 326)May include surrounding context.

python
if filters:
                for key, value in filters.items():
                    query = query.filter(getattr(self.__model__, key) == value)

            if offset:
                query = query.offset(offset)

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 441)May include surrounding context.

python
if filters:
                for key, value in filters.items():
                    query = query.filter(getattr(self.__model__, key) == value)

            return query.scalar()
        finally:

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

python
elif isinstance(cur, dict):
                        cur = cur.get(part, default)
                    else:
                        cur = getattr(cur, part)
                return cur
            except Exception:
                return default