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Security audit

Adult Facial Fatigue / Stress Index | 成人面部疲劳/压力指数分析

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because scanners report undisclosed account and identity handling, unclear consent around sensitive facial media processing, and mismatches between the stated purpose and some reported capabilities.

Consider the suspicious verdict before installing, especially if you would provide facial images or videos. The scanners report remote processing, identity transfer, account creation, and credential storage without clear disclosure or authorization; the analysis was partial because a referenced local path was missing, so the evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
Findings (25)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The supplied chunk's implemented purpose is user-account persistence, not facial analysis or fatigue/stress scoring. Database storage could support the declared system, but this code specifically manages general user profiles and tokens and contains no facial measurements, image/video processing, or scoring logic linking that storage to the stated purpose. The mismatch is limited to the supplied chunk; it does not establish what other skill components implement. No token transmission or external data exfiltration is shown.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The visible implementation does not substantiate the declared primary purpose. It is generic scaffolding with a nonfunctional chat helper, not an implemented facial-analysis system. No active external command execution, camera access, or network transmission is demonstrated. Imported base and API classes are not supplied, so any capabilities they might provide cannot be verified from this chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Generic utilities and HTTP transport could support the declared analysis service and are not inherently mismatches. However, this chunk also implements an undisclosed account lifecycle: local identity discovery or generation, remote registration with silent=1 and register=1, persistent credential management, and billing-related responses. Those are substantive behaviors beyond the stated facial-analysis purpose. Debug mode additionally enables low-level HTTP logging that can expose request details. These behaviors generally occur when the relevant helpers are invoked; the chunk does not establish that facial images are transmitted or that the wider skill lacks an analysis implementation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Delegating video analysis to another component and saving its output are consistent supporting implementation details. However, the --list branch invokes get_output_analysis_list with the current user's OpenID, exposing a separate historical-record retrieval capability absent from the description. The supplied chunk does not show the underlying facial measurements or scoring implementation, so their correctness or presence cannot be verified here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The image/video inputs, report formatting, and result-file output are consistent with the declared analysis workflow. However, retrieving historical reports and automatically invoking that retrieval through specified keywords extend the declared functionality. The snippet does not establish how reports are stored or whether the claimed facial measurements are implemented.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

YARA rule 'agent_skill_mcp_tool_poisoning_metadata': MCP/tool metadata poisoning indicators in tool schemas or skill manifests [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: "smyx-adult-facial-fatigue-stress-index-analysis"
description: "Using a smart mirror or fixed camera, the system analyzes high-resolution adult facial images or short videos to detect physiological features such as under-eye bag area (puffiness/shadow under the lower eyelid), dark-circle grayscale (darkness around the eyes), mouth-corner drop angle (angle between corner of mouth and horizontal), and glabellar frown lines (vertical lines between the brows), and computes a comprehensive. | 通过智能镜子或固定摄像头,分析成人面部的高清图像或视频,检测眼袋面积(下眼睑区域的浮肿或阴影面积)、黑眼�

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Default activation treats any adult frontal-face analysis request as a fatigue/stress assessment.

Medium
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The default trigger treats a general request to analyze an adult frontal-face image as authorization for fatigue/stress assessment. This can expand an unrelated image request into sensitive health-related inference and potentially remote processing without specific user intent, particularly concerning in workplace settings.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The analysis workflow lacks a specific warning about remote processing of sensitive facial data.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The workflow accepts local facial media and instructs immediate analysis without a clear pre-upload disclosure or confirmation of remote processing. References to APIs and a general consent note do not ensure informed authorization to disclose identifiable facial data and associated health-related assessments to an external provider.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The --export-env-only option promises not to run analysis, but the code ignores it and proceeds with facial analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The parser advertises --export-env-only as not performing analysis, but execution never checks the flag. With an input supplied, a caller relying on this assurance still reaches facial analysis and potentially uploads sensitive media; identity initialization also runs regardless.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_analysis/scripts/skill.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
result_json = JsonUtil.parse(result_json_pure_text, result_json_pure_text)

        result_json_common_ai_response = result_json.get("commonAiResponse") if isinstance(result_json,
                                                                                           dict) else result_json
        if result_json_common_ai_response:
            result_json = result_json_common_ai_response

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_analysis/scripts/skill.py (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

python
result_json = result_json_common_ai_response

        result_json_health_ai_response = result_json.get("healthAiResponse") if isinstance(result_json,
                                                                                           dict) else result_json
        if result_json_health_ai_response:
            result_json = result_json_health_ai_response

Local video content is passed to the analysis API without disclosure that the file will be uploaded.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The method reads the entire local media file into a multipart payload and passes it to the analysis API without a visible disclosure or authorization gate. In this facial-health context, users can unintentionally disclose identifiable facial imagery rather than merely have a local file analyzed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The --export-env-only option promises not to analyze input, but does not prevent analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The --export-env-only flag is parsed but never used to stop execution. When media is supplied, the supposedly non-analysis invocation still calls the remote-analysis workflow, potentially exposing sensitive video content against the caller's expressed expectation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

ai_chat documents an agent invocation and analysis result, but performs neither.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The docstring at L26–L34 says the method invokes the OpenClaw agent through subprocess and returns an analysis result or session ID. However, the invocation is commented out at L61–L66, and accessing stderr on the empty dictionary created at L68 raises an exception that is caught at L81–L82, causing the method to return None without performing the documented analysis.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

FileUtil.open silently truncates existing files without disclosing its write-only behavior.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The generically named open helper always opens the supplied path in 'w' mode, immediately erasing existing contents. No docstring, explanatory comment, confirmation, or user-facing log discloses this destructive behavior; exception reporting only occurs after a failure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The request helper silently registers remote user accounts and persists their credentials, extending beyond the advertised facial fatigue/stress analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

An ordinary request can trigger remote login or registration using silent=1 and register=1, then persist returned access tokens in the local SQLite user record without a visible consent step. This creates an undisclosed account and credential lifecycle; linking that identity to facial wellness analysis increases privacy sensitivity, although no malicious destination is established.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Automatic remote login or registration transmits the current identity without disclosure.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The helper automatically sends the current identity as both openId and mobile to the configured health-service login endpoint, without a visible disclosure or consent gate. The identity selection can also fall back to API_SECRET_KEY, potentially placing a credential in fields intended for user identifiers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The POST is not suspicious merely because it uses the network, but this call transmits an automatically selected identity and requests silent registration without a visible consent check. That identity can originate from API_SECRET_KEY; the supplied code does not establish that the configured endpoint is malicious or that facial images are included in this request.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py (reported line 561)May include surrounding context.

python
"source": ConstantEnum.DEFAULT__SKILL_HUB_NAME
            }
            try:
                _response = requests.post(_url, json=_data)
                if _response.status_code == 200:
                    _response_json = _response.json()
                    if _response_json and _response_json.get("success"):

Configuration loading silently creates directories and files without disclosing this side effect.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

YamlUtil.load creates parent directories and writes a YAML file when the requested configuration is missing, without a log, confirmation, or explanatory comment/docstring. BaseEnum.init_subclass calls this loader during class creation (L053 and L058), so importing the module can modify the filesystem even though the operation appears to be configuration loading.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 243)May include surrounding context.

python
username = getattr(model, "username", None)
            if username:
                column_names = self.__model__.__table__.columns.keys()
                update_data = {key: getattr(model, key) for key in column_names if key != "username"}
                return self.update_by_username(username, **update_data)

            return None

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 326)May include surrounding context.

python
if filters:
                for key, value in filters.items():
                    query = query.filter(getattr(self.__model__, key) == value)

            if offset:
                query = query.offset(offset)

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 441)May include surrounding context.

python
if filters:
                for key, value in filters.items():
                    query = query.filter(getattr(self.__model__, key) == value)

            return query.scalar()
        finally:

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 353)May include surrounding context.

python
column_names = self.__model__.__table__.columns.keys()

            for key in column_names:
                value = getattr(model, key)
                setattr(instance, key, value)

            session.commit()

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

python
elif isinstance(cur, dict):
                        cur = cur.get(part, default)
                    else:
                        cur = getattr(cur, part)
                return cur
            except Exception:
                return default