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Security audit

posteahora

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill includes publishing safeguards, but its troubleshooting instructions request unnecessarily broad account access.

Use a key limited to the intended workspace and required permissions; investigate authentication errors instead of automatically granting full access. Pin a reviewed CLI version, approve posting destinations and content, and remember that uploaded media receives a public URL. Saved authentication persists locally unless removed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (11)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

Analytics reporting is a distinct user-facing capability not disclosed in the scheduling and publishing description, rather than an implementation detail needed to publish posts. The snippet documents analytics commands; it does not establish how they are implemented or what underlying resources they access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The supplied script exposes an analytics-reporting capability not mentioned in the declared description. Although related to social media management, retrieving performance reports is distinct from implementing post planning, scheduling, or publishing. No publishing or scheduling occurs in this chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx @posteahora/cli'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Although this command runs a CLI rather than an MCP server, the unpinned npx invocation creates a supply-chain risk by allowing execution of a changing package version. A compromised release could execute arbitrary code with the invoking user's permissions, even when the requested argument is only --help; no compromise is demonstrated here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx @posteahora/cli'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The unpinned npx command may obtain and execute a different package release over time, creating a supply-chain exposure despite the scanner's inaccurate MCP label. Because the accounts command normally uses authentication, a compromised release could also access the user's available PosteAhora credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Live posting examples lack a warning about external publication.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The workflow examples execute authenticated posts to Twitter and LinkedIn, including automatically from CI. They do not warn that running these commands transmits the supplied content to external services and publishes it through the selected accounts, rather than merely testing the CLI.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx -y @posteahora/cli'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The CI example executes an unpinned npm package with automatic installation approval while providing a live API credential in its environment. If a resolved release were compromised, it could steal that credential, publish unauthorized content, or access other resources available to the workflow step.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · HOW_TO_RUN.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

md
| Setting | Resolution order |
|---------|------------------|
| API key | `--key` → `POSTEAHORA_API_KEY` → `~/.posteahora/config.json` |
| Base URL | `POSTEAHORA_API_URL` (default `https://api.posteahora.com/functions/v1/api`) |

## Verify it works

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx @posteahora/cli'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The documented npx command can download and execute an unpinned package version, allowing a future compromised release to run with the invoking user's permissions. This is particularly relevant for an agent-facing CLI that handles publishing credentials, although the README provides no evidence of an actual compromise. The finding incorrectly describes the command as an MCP server invocation; it invokes the CLI.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 255)May include surrounding context.

md
| Setting | Source (in order of precedence) |
|---------|---------------------------------|
| API key | `--key` flag → `POSTEAHORA_API_KEY` → `~/.posteahora/config.json` |
| Base URL | `POSTEAHORA_API_URL` (default `https://api.posteahora.com/functions/v1/api`) |

---

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx @posteahora/cli'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends executing an npm package without specifying a reviewed version; its global installation examples are also unpinned. Although this is a CLI rather than an MCP server, the underlying supply-chain concern is valid: a compromised or malicious future release could execute with the agent's local privileges and potentially access credentials or connected publishing accounts. Nothing in the supplied file demonstrates that the package is currently malicious.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The no-key-storage guardrail contradicts the prescribed authentication workflow.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

L202 says never to store the API key, but L63 prescribes an authentication command that L66 explicitly says stores the key in ~/.posteahora/config.json. Following the documented workflow therefore persists a credential despite the unconditional no-storage guardrail.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.