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Security audit

nextjs-to-tauri

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill benign with medium confidence: the reported findings appear related to release and build guidance, though some review concerns remain and the scan was incomplete.

The verdict is benign, not a guarantee of safety, and confidence is medium. Consider whether you are comfortable with release scripts that can replace published assets and with a skill whose runtime permissions are not established. Skillspector inspected 13 of 20 components fully; seven were only partially inspected because their contents could not be fully interpreted, so the evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (8)

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 143)May include surrounding context.

md
on for published corrections, or adapt to the repository's existing publication policy. |
| 7 | **Committing the private signing key** lets anyone sign malicious auto-updates your clients auto-trust. The `.pub` is public/safe; the bare key is not. | `.gitignore` the private key; store it only as a GitHub secret. If one ever lands in git history, rotate it. |
| 8 | **Portable exe is mistaken for an installed, self-updating app.** | The raw binary still needs WebView2 and is distributed without a self-update guarantee. Catch and surface install failures; test any proposed portable update path separately. If portable builds must make no updater requests, use the [no-updater checklist](tauri-files.md#optional-updater-keep-the-layers-consistent) or another verified package-specific switch. |
| 9 | **System-language detection returns the wrong or unsupported locale.** | Preserve the product's language policy. The example starts at the configured default and remembers an explicit choice. If a

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

md
- crates: read and parse the package metadata as JSON, for example:
     ```bash
     # Save metadata, then parse it as data.
     curl -sA x -o crates-tauri.json https://crates.io/api/v1/crates/tauri
     node -p "JSON.parse(require('fs').readFileSync('crates-tauri.json','utf8')).crate.max_stable_version"
     ```
     `max_stable_version` is an upstream reference, not the install target when it is outside 2.x. Select published, non-yanked stable 2.x releases for core and each required plugin (`tauri-plugin-opener`, `tauri-plugin-updater`, …), and verify their compatibility.

The script uploads checksums to a GitHub release and can overwrite an existing release asset without disclosure.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The command publishes SHA256SUMS to the release identified by TAG and REPO, using --clobber to replace an existing asset. Remote publication and replacement go beyond the script's apparent checksum-writing purpose, and there is no explanatory comment, confirmation, or user-facing notice about these effects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · release-workflow.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

md
are-draft.sh` validates the tag, rejects duplicate/public releases, creates or reuses the draft and exports its ID plus the checkout commit.
- The build workflow injects the tag version into package.json before `yarn update-version` copies it into Tauri config. Installer names, the embedded version and portable upload tag all use the built version. Manual runs retain the committed version. Keep frontend installation and version propagation as separate steps.
- Linux dependency installation uses sudo on an ephemeral Ubuntu runner. It writes outside the checkout on that runner; it is not a local setup command. Rust and frontend caches also live on the runner.
- Set TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY and, when needed, TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PASSWORD as repository secrets before a signed updater build. Never commit the private key. Updater signatures are separate from Windows/macOS code signing and notarization; configure those for the actual distribution.
- `ci/prepare-portable.sh` first requir

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tauri-build.yml (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

yaml
ref: ${{ inputs.source-commit || github.sha }}
      - name: Refresh apt package lists
        if: inputs.runner == 'ubuntu-22.04'
        run: sudo apt-get update
      - name: Install Tauri Linux build dependencies
        if: inputs.runner == 'ubuntu-22.04'
        run: sudo apt-get install -y libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev build-essential curl wget file libxdo-dev libssl-dev libayatana-appindicator3-dev librsvg2-dev patchelf libgtk-3-dev

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tauri-build.yml (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

yaml
run: sudo apt-get update
      - name: Install Tauri Linux build dependencies
        if: inputs.runner == 'ubuntu-22.04'
        run: sudo apt-get install -y libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev build-essential curl wget file libxdo-dev libssl-dev libayatana-appindicator3-dev librsvg2-dev patchelf libgtk-3-dev
      - name: Setup Node
        uses: actions/setup-node@v7
        with:

The script overwrites temporary JSON files without disclosing the writes.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The shell redirection overwrites draft-assets.json, and the download command explicitly enables overwriting build-feed.json with --clobber. Neither operation has a confirmation, user-facing log, or explanatory comment disclosing that existing files at these paths will be replaced.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.