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Security audit

whetstone

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill benign with high confidence: all 25 components were inspected, and the two low-probability findings were judged expected for its purpose.

The verdict is benign, and all scanned components were inspected. Before installing, consider that the skill has environment and shell capabilities without a declared tool scope; this scan does not establish how the host runtime restricts them. Benign does not mean risk-free.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/change_scan.py (reported line 174)May include surrounding context.

python
def _git(repo: str, *args: str) -> str:
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            ["git", "-C", repo, *args],
            check=False,
            capture_output=True,