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Security audit

LadybugDB openCypher

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill benign with high confidence: all ten reported components were fully scanned, and the flagged items were judged consistent with the skill’s purpose, though benign does not mean risk-free.

The verdict is benign with high confidence, and the reported scan coverage is complete. Before installing, consider whether the skill’s file and shell capabilities fit your use and whether you need to install its separately pinned dependency; the scan did not verify the host runtime’s permission enforcement.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api-reference.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

md
## OpenClaw installation checks

Only when installation verification is requested, check intended agents with `openclaw skills info ladybug-opencypher-updated --agent <id> --json`: version, `eligible`, `disabled`, `blockedByAgentFilter`, `modelVisible`. Shared files do not override filters. Check Python execution separately; discovery alone is insufficient. Do not restart a Gateway merely to refresh skills.

## Python: sync

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: file_read, file_write, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/test_helpers.py (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

python
self.db = Path(self.temp.name) / "test.lbdb"

    def run_query(self, query, *options):
        return subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(SCRIPTS / "run_cypher.py"),
                               str(self.db), "-c", query, *options],
                              capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=45)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/test_helpers.py (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

python
self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)

    def test_environment(self):
        result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(SCRIPTS / "check_env.py"), "--smoke"],
                                capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15)
        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)
        self.assertIn("0.21.2", result.stdout)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/test_helpers.py (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

python
params = Path(self.temp.name)/"params.json"
        query.write_text("MATCH (p:Paper {id:$id}) RETURN p.title", encoding="utf-8")
        params.write_text('{"id":"b"}', encoding="utf-8")
        result = subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(SCRIPTS/"run_cypher.py"),str(self.db),
                 "--file",str(query),"--params-file",str(params),"--print-rows"],capture_output=True,text=True,timeout=45)
        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)
        self.assertIn('["B"]',result.stdout)

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check_env.py (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

python
(getattr(lb, "Connection", None), "close"),
              (getattr(lb, "QueryResult", None), "get_num_tuples"),
              (getattr(lb, "QueryResult", None), "get_next")]
    missing = [name for owner, name in checks if not callable(getattr(owner, name, None))]
    if missing:
        print("FAIL: missing API: " + ", ".join(missing), file=sys.stderr)
        return 1