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Security audit

Get Hired PRO - Get the Job of Your Dreams

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marks this skill benign because the listed alerts were judged expected for its career-application purpose, though the scan is incomplete and confidence is medium.

The verdict is benign, not risk-free, and has medium confidence. Skillspector reports partial analysis: a local reference was unresolved and binary image content was outside its analysis scope. Consider the missing privacy notice for application materials sent to employers or applicant-tracking systems, and note that the skill's runtime tool permissions were not verified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • System Prompt LeakageDirect Leakage, Indirect Extraction, Tool-Based Exfiltration
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
Findings (15)

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/application-management.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md
Start the record when preparing a chosen application. Discovery results belong in the shortlist until selected. Update the affected entry; keep prior submissions and approved revisions.

Use clear states:
- Prepared: the documents are ready; no submission has been established.
- Submitted: a confirmation page, receipt, employer portal status or equivalent evidence establishes completion.
- Blocked: a tool or employer barrier prevents progress.

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/writing-methods.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

md
## Application editing and formatting

Use the full editing guide as reference for Get Hired PRO's single consolidated review. Its standalone output instruction and input placeholder do not override the review task. If something cannot be stated factually and confidently, leave that statement out and present relevant facts positively without hedging; preserve the underlying accomplishments. This is writing judgment, not a claim-verification stage.

Read and apply the [formatting guide](formatting.md) in drafting, review and delivery. Supply its actual text to isolated workers. Use visible spacing between paragraphs and sections, and keep the applicant's preferred presentation readable.

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_documents.py (reported line 363)May include surrounding context.

python
def test_utf8_packet_works_with_non_utf8_locale(self):
        path = self.directory / 'input.json'
        path.write_text(json.dumps(packet(), ensure_ascii=False), encoding='utf-8')
        env = os.environ.copy()
        env.update(LC_ALL='C', LANG='C', PYTHONUTF8='0', PYTHONCOERCECLOCALE='0', PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE='1')
        out = self.directory / 'unicode'
        result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(ROOT / 'scripts/render_documents.py'), str(path), str(out)],

The application-submission workflow lacks a privacy warning about sending applicant information to external recipients.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The workflow submits tailored résumés and cover letters, which can contain contact details and detailed employment history. Although submission is advertised, the README does not warn that these personal details will leave the user's environment and may be retained by employers or their applicant-tracking providers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Instructions to upload and submit applications omit a warning about external disclosure of personal career data.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to upload application documents and submit chosen applications using available tools. It provides packaging and delivery instructions but no privacy warning that résumés, letters, and application answers will be disclosed to employers and potentially third-party applicant-tracking systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The submission procedure does not warn users about disclosure and retention of application data by external systems.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

These steps direct the agent to complete employer forms and upload résumé and cover-letter files. Working within an agreed application scope limits the action, but the procedure does not tell users that their personal information will be transmitted to employer or applicant-tracking systems and may remain there after submission.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/formatting.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

md
gnature with intentional spacing.
- Leave a visible gap between body paragraphs: the bundled standard layout uses **10 pt after each paragraph** and about **1.1 line spacing**, with 11 pt body text. A comparable readable layout in another document tool is suitable.
- Keep contact lines together, with modest separation; use a larger gap before the date, recipient and salutation. Keep the closing and signature together.
- Count the actual contact paragraphs and include `contact_lines_count` in the document packet, including zero when there are none. The Claw supplies this; do not ask the user to configure it. Put each complete paragraph in one array entry, without empty entries or embedded line breaks. Paragraph formatting supplies the gaps.
- Use the standard spacing profile by default. The optional compact profile still leaves **6 pt between body paragraphs**. Use it only when appropriate to the requested presentation; do not collapse paragraph spacing to force a page count.

## Résumé

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_combined_documents.py (reported line 116)May include surrounding context.

python
counts = {}
        for name in ['Resume', 'Letter', 'Application']:
            path = out / (name + '.pdf')
            texts[name] = subprocess.check_output(['pdftotext', str(path), '-'], text=True)
            info = subprocess.check_output(['pdfinfo', str(path)], text=True)
            counts[name] = int(next(line.split(':', 1)[1] for line in info.splitlines()
                                    if line.startswith('Pages:')))

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_combined_documents.py (reported line 117)May include surrounding context.

python
for name in ['Resume', 'Letter', 'Application']:
            path = out / (name + '.pdf')
            texts[name] = subprocess.check_output(['pdftotext', str(path), '-'], text=True)
            info = subprocess.check_output(['pdfinfo', str(path)], text=True)
            counts[name] = int(next(line.split(':', 1)[1] for line in info.splitlines()
                                    if line.startswith('Pages:')))
        self.assertGreater(counts['Resume'], 1)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_combined_documents.py (reported line 126)May include surrounding context.

python
' '.join((texts['Resume'] + texts['Letter']).split()))
        pages = texts['Application'].split('\f')
        self.assertIn('Northwind team', pages[counts['Resume']])
        links = subprocess.check_output(['pdfinfo', '-url', str(out / 'Application.pdf')], text=True)
        self.assertIn('https://example.org/letter', links)
        self.assertIn('https://example.org/profile', links)
        before = {p.name: (fingerprint(p), p.stat().st_mtime_ns) for p in out.glob('*.pdf')}

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_documents.py (reported line 206)May include surrounding context.

python
])
        if importlib.util.find_spec('weasyprint') and shutil.which('pdftotext'):
            renderer.render(source, out, resume=True, format='pdf')
            text = subprocess.check_output(
                ['pdftotext', str(out / 'Resume.pdf'), '-'], text=True)
            previous = -1
            for block in source['resume_blocks']:

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_documents.py (reported line 366)May include surrounding context.

python
env = os.environ.copy()
        env.update(LC_ALL='C', LANG='C', PYTHONUTF8='0', PYTHONCOERCECLOCALE='0', PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE='1')
        out = self.directory / 'unicode'
        result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(ROOT / 'scripts/render_documents.py'), str(path), str(out)],
                                env=env, capture_output=True)
        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 0, result.stderr)
        self.assertEqual(json.loads((out / 'packet.json').read_text(encoding='utf-8'))['resume_blocks'][0]['text'], 'José Chen')

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_documents.py (reported line 386)May include surrounding context.

python
self.assertTrue((out / (name + '.pdf')).read_bytes().startswith(b'%PDF-'))
            _, paragraphs, expected_urls = inspect(out / (name + '.docx'))
            if shutil.which('pdftotext'):
                extracted = subprocess.check_output(['pdftotext', str(out / (name + '.pdf')), '-'], text=True)
                normalized = ' '.join(extracted.split())
                for paragraph in paragraphs:
                    self.assertIn(' '.join(''.join(paragraph.itertext()).split()), normalized)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_documents.py (reported line 391)May include surrounding context.

python
for paragraph in paragraphs:
                    self.assertIn(' '.join(''.join(paragraph.itertext()).split()), normalized)
            if shutil.which('pdfinfo'):
                urls = subprocess.check_output(['pdfinfo', '-url', str(out / (name + '.pdf'))], text=True)
                for url in expected_urls:
                    self.assertIn(url, urls)