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Security audit

app-audit-lite

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marked this skill suspicious because it found a concern about exposing an API key in a command’s arguments and a workflow that can make repository changes beyond the stated app-audit purpose.

Consider whether you trust the AppGoat API destination and are comfortable granting the optional workflow repository write and push access. The API-key handling concern merits review. Scanning was partial: only half of the two components were fully covered, and obfuscated instruction text and some references could not be fully evaluated, so the evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

The API-key handling contradicts the claim that the key is not placed on the command line (L154–L155).

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The shell expands APPGOAT_API_KEY into jq's command-line arguments through --arg, contradicting the comment that the key is not placed on the command line. Processes with sufficient access to inspect arguments could recover the credential during execution; the ephemeral hosted-runner context limits, but does not eliminate, exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 156)May include surrounding context.

md
cp -r /tmp/appgoat-skills/skills/* .claude/skills/
          # Hosted AppGoat MCP server; the key goes into a file, not the command line.
          jq -n --arg key "$APPGOAT_API_KEY" \
            '{mcpServers: {appgoat: {type: "http", url: "https://api.appgoat.ai/mcp", headers: {"x-api-key": $key}}}}' \
            > "$RUNNER_TEMP/appgoat-mcp.json"
      - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
        with:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · reference/api.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
# REST fallback

Without the AppGoat MCP server, call the API directly. Base URL `https://api.appgoat.ai/v1`,
header `x-api-key: $APPGOAT_API_KEY` (create a key at https://dash.appgoat.ai). Responses are
`{ "data": …, "meta": { "credits_used", "credits_remaining", "freshness", "next_cursor", "warnings" } }`;
errors are `{ "error": { "code", "message", "hint" } }` - read `hint`. `{app}` must be URL-encoded.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · reference/api.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -s -H "x-api-key: $APPGOAT_API_KEY" \
  "https://api.appgoat.ai/v1/apps/$(python3 -c 'import urllib.parse,sys;print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.argv[1],safe=""))' 'https://apps.apple.com/us/app/id284882215')?country=us"

The automation workflow adds repository writes and pushes beyond the manifest's app-audit scope (L130–L166).

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes retrieving app-store data and producing a prioritized fix list. The optional workflow additionally instructs the agent to write a repository file, commit it, and push it, backed by contents-write permission at L140–L141 and Git tool access at L166; these persistent repository changes are not declared in the manifest.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.