Back to skill

Security audit

postnext-social-manager

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s social-media management capabilities are clearly disclosed and require approval steps before account changes.

Use a dedicated PostNext key and approve each exact preview. Select the intended channel explicitly: otherwise the helper chooses the first matching connection. Confirmation codes can be reused, and repeating a confirmed publish or schedule can create duplicates. Uploaded media leaves your device through PostNext and its storage provider. This assessment reviewed all bundled files and resolved the material scanner gaps through source inspection; it did not test live API behavior.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

md
allowed-tools: Bash(./postnext:*), Bash(jq:*), Read

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

md
or-prone parts for you and asks for the user's approval before any change. Run `./postnext help`.

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · postnext (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

text
esac
    rm -f "$tmp"; die "HTTP $code: $msg"
  fi
  cat "$tmp"; rm -f "$tmp"
}

# unwrap: read stdin, return .data if the {success,data} envelope is present, else the body as-is

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · postnext (reported line 277)May include surrounding context.

text
cmd_delete() {
  id_and_confirm "postnext delete <groupId> [--confirm CODE]" "$@"
  gate "$(jq -n --arg id "$ID" '{op:"delete", groupId:$id}')" "$CONFIRM"
  api DELETE "/api/posts/$ID" | jq '.data'
}

# analytics sync [--confirm CODE] -> a paid, rate-limited POST that snapshots fresh metrics server-side

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · postnext (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

text
local tmp code
  tmp="$(mktemp)"
  if [ -n "$body" ]; then
    code="$(kcurl -sS -o "$tmp" -w '%{http_code}' -X "$method" "$BASE$path" \
      -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$body")"
  else
    code="$(kcurl -sS -o "$tmp" -w '%{http_code}' -X "$method" "$BASE$path")"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · postnext (reported line 140)May include surrounding context.

text
upl_url="$(echo "$init" | jq -r '.data.uploadUrl')"
    case "$upl_url" in https://*) ;; *) die "refusing non-https upload URL";; esac
    # PUT the bytes; Content-Type MUST match the signed contentType or S3 rejects the signature
    curl -sS -X PUT "$upl_url" -H "Content-Type: $mime" --data-binary "@$file" >/dev/null \
      || die "S3 upload PUT failed"
    api POST /api/assets/upload/complete "$(jq -n --arg u "$upl_id" '{uploadId:$u}')" \
      | jq -r '.data.url'