Incomplete referenced artifact analysis
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md allowed-tools: Bash(./postnext:*), Bash(jq:*), Read
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill’s social-media management capabilities are clearly disclosed and require approval steps before account changes.
Use a dedicated PostNext key and approve each exact preview. Select the intended channel explicitly: otherwise the helper chooses the first matching connection. Confirmation codes can be reused, and repeating a confirmed publish or schedule can create duplicates. Uploaded media leaves your device through PostNext and its storage provider. This assessment reviewed all bundled files and resolved the material scanner gaps through source inspection; it did not test live API behavior.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
allowed-tools: Bash(./postnext:*), Bash(jq:*), Read
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
or-prone parts for you and asks for the user's approval before any change. Run `./postnext help`.
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
esac
rm -f "$tmp"; die "HTTP $code: $msg"
fi
cat "$tmp"; rm -f "$tmp"
}
# unwrap: read stdin, return .data if the {success,data} envelope is present, else the body as-is
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
cmd_delete() {
id_and_confirm "postnext delete <groupId> [--confirm CODE]" "$@"
gate "$(jq -n --arg id "$ID" '{op:"delete", groupId:$id}')" "$CONFIRM"
api DELETE "/api/posts/$ID" | jq '.data'
}
# analytics sync [--confirm CODE] -> a paid, rate-limited POST that snapshots fresh metrics server-side
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
local tmp code
tmp="$(mktemp)"
if [ -n "$body" ]; then
code="$(kcurl -sS -o "$tmp" -w '%{http_code}' -X "$method" "$BASE$path" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$body")"
else
code="$(kcurl -sS -o "$tmp" -w '%{http_code}' -X "$method" "$BASE$path")"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
upl_url="$(echo "$init" | jq -r '.data.uploadUrl')"
case "$upl_url" in https://*) ;; *) die "refusing non-https upload URL";; esac
# PUT the bytes; Content-Type MUST match the signed contentType or S3 rejects the signature
curl -sS -X PUT "$upl_url" -H "Content-Type: $mime" --data-binary "@$file" >/dev/null \
|| die "S3 upload PUT failed"
api POST /api/assets/upload/complete "$(jq -n --arg u "$upl_id" '{uploadId:$u}')" \
| jq -r '.data.url'