Google Docs Log Automation — Append log lines to auto-created daily documents in Google Drive by PortEden Secure Access.

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 12, 2026 · 5:12 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Google Docs logging helper, but users should treat logged content and the PortEden CLI/token as cloud-access sensitive.

Before installing, verify you trust PortEden and the install source, use a dedicated or least-privilege Google account or folder where possible, restrict folder sharing, and avoid logging secrets, tokens, personal data, customer data, or regulated information unless you have explicitly approved that cloud storage and retention model.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:5

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party CLI Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 5–13
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned executable dependency from mutable upstream sources
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml

metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"📝","requires":{"bins":["porteden"],"env":["PE_API_KEY"]},"primaryEnv":"PE_API_KEY","install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"porteden/tap/porteden","bins":["porteden"],"label":"Install porteden (brew)"},{"id":"go","kind":"go","module":"github.com/porteden/cli/cmd/porteden@latest","bins":["porteden"],"label":"Install porteden (go)"}]}}

markdown

If `porteden` is not installed: `brew install porteden/tap/porteden` (or `go install github.com/porteden/cli/cmd/porteden@latest`).

Technical Analysis

The skill directs users or agents to install and execute the porteden CLI from mutable third-party sources. In particular, the Go installation uses @latest, which resolves to whichever upstream version is current at installation time rather than a version reviewed during this audit. The custom Homebrew tap is also installed without a pinned version, commit, checksum, or signature-verification procedure.

This creates a time-of-check/time-of-use supply-chain gap: the code executed by a future user may differ from the dependency available when the skill was reviewed. This dependency is security-sensitive because the skill requires PE_API_KEY, supports authentication tokens stored in the system keyring, and uses the installed CLI to access connected Google Drive resources.

No evidence establishes that the current upstream dependency is malicious. The vulnerability is the unsafe, mutable dependency-installation mechanism and the absence of integrity controls.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the upstream Go repository, release process, PortEden Homebrew tap, or an authorized publisher account.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious version that beco ...[truncated 1552 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Replace github.com/porteden/cli/cmd/porteden@latest with a specific, reviewed release version.
2. Where practical, pin the dependency to an immutable source commit rather than a mutable tag.
3. Pin the Homebrew installation to a reviewed release and avoid silently tracking the current tap formula.
4. Publish cryptographic checksums for supported binaries and require checksum verification before execution.
5. Use signed releases or artifact attestations and document how users must verify the publisher signature.
6. Maintain a documented dependency-update process that includes source review, security testing, and explicit version changes in SKILL.md.
7. Run the CLI with least-privilege Drive scopes and narrowly scoped PortEden tokens to reduce the impact of a compromised dependency.
8. Avoid exposing unrelated secrets to the CLI process; use a restricted environment containing only the variables required for the logging workflow.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Rogue Agent: Self-Modification, Session Persistence
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (4)

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

md

### 1. Authenticate (once)

- **Browser login (recommended):** `porteden auth login` — opens browser, credentials stored in system keyring
- **Direct token:** `porteden auth login --token <key>` — stored in system keyring
- **Verify:** `porteden auth status`
- If `PE_API_KEY` is set in the environment, the CLI uses it automatically (no login needed).

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

md

### 1. Authenticate (once)

- **Browser login (recommended):** `porteden auth login` — opens browser, credentials stored in system keyring
- **Direct token:** `porteden auth login --token <key>` — stored in system keyring
- **Verify:** `porteden auth status`
- If `PE_API_KEY` is set in the environment, the CLI uses it automatically (no login needed).

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent
• Confidence: 82% confidence

Finding

The skill promotes a persistent cloud-based logging workflow that agents can write to 'from anywhere,' with daily documents retained in Google Drive. That creates session/persistence and audit-data retention risk because agent outputs may accumulate over time in a remotely accessible location, potentially exposing historical operational data if the account or folder is misconfigured or compromised.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

md

# porteden docs-logger

Append log lines to daily Google Docs — one document per day, auto-created inside a `PE_Logs` folder. Works like a cloud-native `.txt` log file that agents can write to from anywhere. **Use `-jc` flags** for AI-optimized output.

If `porteden` is not installed: `brew install porteden/tap/porteden` (or `go install github.com/porteden/cli/cmd/porteden@latest`).

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs agents to append arbitrary log lines to Google Docs/Drive but does not clearly warn that log contents are transmitted to third-party cloud services. This creates a real risk of operators or autonomous agents sending sensitive data, secrets, or regulated information off-host without informed consent or data-classification checks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.