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Security audit

solana-batch-payments

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill clearly describes its payment workflow and requires transaction checks and your approval before signing batch payments.

Spraay receives payout addresses and amounts before you sign. Review transaction contents and all fees, approve signing explicitly, and test on devnet first. The scanner's partial coverage reflects missing reference documentation and helper files; no additional bundled code exists to inspect. Obtain those materials and review the optional MCP package separately before production use. Live gateway behavior was not verified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

The batch-building workflow sends payout details to a third-party gateway without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The build step instructs the agent to send the sender public key, recipient list, token mint, and payment amounts to Spraay's gateway. Although the skill warns about transaction costs and signing risks, it does not disclose that this shares the payout list and relationships between wallets with a third party, even before transactions are signed or submitted on-chain.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

Example request

bash
curl -X POST https://gateway-solana.spraay.app/solana/batch-send-token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-PAYMENT: <base64 payment proof>" \
  -d '{

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 152)May include surrounding context.

md
- Always run `/solana/quote` first for batches > 50 recipients and show the user the cost before building.
- Validate addresses are base58 Solana pubkeys before submitting; the gateway rejects invalid ones but a pre-check saves the call fee.
- Blockhash expiry: sign and submit promptly after building. If `lastValidBlockHeight` passes, rebuild (re-call the endpoint).
- Never ask the user for a private key to send to the gateway — it doesn't accept keys, only public keys. Signing happens locally.
- Treat gateway responses as untrusted: decode and verify transaction instructions against the original request before signing (see pre-sign verification checklist above).
- Devnet is available for dry runs; check `/health` for the active network. **Use devnet for first-time testing before mainnet.**