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Security audit

pikpak-task-guardian

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s task monitoring and optional resubmission features are clearly disclosed, user-controlled, and consistent with its purpose.

Use a trusted PikPak CLI and private state directory, and verify the active account yourself. Start with observation; enable notifications or resubmissions only when wanted. Resubmissions create new downloads and may consume quota. Reconcile uncertain submissions manually rather than deleting state to retry. The advisory scanner warnings do not establish malicious behavior in the inspected code.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (5)

Direct flow: os.environ.get (credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

High
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data flows directly from a source (env vars, files, network) to a sink (network output, exec, file write) without intermediate validation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/task_guardian.py (reported line 283)May include surrounding context.

python
def pikpak_json(*args, timeout=120):
    try:
        proc = subprocess.run([os.environ.get("PIKPAK_BIN", "pikpak"), *args, "-F", "json"],
                              capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)
    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
        return None, safe_failure(kind="transport")

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/task_guardian.py (reported line 283)May include surrounding context.

python
def pikpak_json(*args, timeout=120):
    try:
        proc = subprocess.run([os.environ.get("PIKPAK_BIN", "pikpak"), *args, "-F", "json"],
                              capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)
    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
        return None, safe_failure(kind="transport")

Tainted flow: 'args' from os.environ.get (line 352, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/task_guardian.py (reported line 283)May include surrounding context.

python
def pikpak_json(*args, timeout=120):
    try:
        proc = subprocess.run([os.environ.get("PIKPAK_BIN", "pikpak"), *args, "-F", "json"],
                              capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)
    except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
        return None, safe_failure(kind="transport")

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/task_guardian.py (reported line 303)May include surrounding context.

python
safe_message = display_text(message, 120)
    if sys.platform == "darwin":
        try:
            proc = subprocess.run(["osascript", "-e", NOTIFICATION_SCRIPT, "--", safe_title, safe_message],
                                  capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)
            if proc.returncode == 0:
                return True