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Security audit

基金组合持仓穿透分析

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marks this skill suspicious because scanners report credential exposure, unpinned remote code, and behavior that does not clearly match its fund-analysis purpose; overall confidence is medium and coverage is partial.

Consider the reported API-key handling, remote runner and code sources, and mandatory promotional steps before installing. The verdict is suspicious, not malicious; scanners report real concerns but do not establish malicious intent. Coverage is incomplete because a local reference was missing, so this result does not establish that unreviewed behavior is safe.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (9)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

代码未包含基金持仓读取、底层资产拆解、暴露计算或风险检测逻辑。文档导出可以是分析流程的辅助步骤,但所提供的代码仅执行格式转换,且未体现其与基金分析的关联,因此该代码块的实际用途与声明存在实质性不符。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Installing a runner is relevant to the stated purpose, so downloading files is not itself a description-behavior mismatch. However, the workflow automatically clones or updates an unpinned repository and subsequently executes its Python runner without an integrity-verification step; compromise of the upstream repository or its mirror could therefore result in arbitrary code execution with the agent's filesystem and credential access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 305)May include surrounding context.

md
CUE_KEY=$(python3 -c "import json;print(json.load(open('$HOME/.cue/config.json'))['api_key'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "$CUE_API_KEY")
echo "=== 1/4 API Key ===" && [ -n "$CUE_KEY" ] && echo "已配置" || echo "未配置!"
echo "=== 2/4 Cue 服务 ===" && curl -sS --max-time 10 "https://cuecue.cn/api/health" -H "Authorization: Bearer $CUE_KEY"
echo "=== 3/4 搭子 ===" && curl -sS --max-time 10 "https://cuecue.cn/api/playbook" -H "Authorization: Bearer $CUE_KEY" | python3 -c "import sys,json;scenes=json.load(sys.stdin).get('data',{}).get('scenes',[]);buddy=[b for s in scenes for b in s.get('buddies',[]) if b.get('title')=='基金组合穿透与重复配置排雷'];print(f'可用:{len(buddy)}个') if buddy else print('暂不可用')"
echo "=== 4/4 剩余积分 ===" && python3 -c "
import json, urllib.request, os
p = os.path.expanduser('~/.cue/config.json')

The setup workflow requests an API key in chat without warning about credential exposure.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The setup explicitly tells users to paste their API key into the conversation instead of configuring it through a secret-input mechanism. This unnecessarily exposes the credential to chat retention, logging, and conversation sharing; the statements that the agent cannot view the key do not prevent that exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The setup instructions direct the agent to solicit the user's API key in chat, exposing a credential unnecessarily.

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This identifies the same credential-handling issue as the SQP-2 finding: users are required to disclose an API key in chat. The exposure is unnecessary for fund analysis and could permit unauthorized API use or consumption of account credits if conversation records are accessed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 280)May include surrounding context.

md
| 目标格式 | 依赖 | macOS | Ubuntu |
|----------|------|-------|--------|
| Word (.docx) | pandoc | `brew install pandoc` | `sudo apt install pandoc` |
| PDF (.pdf) | pandoc + LaTeX | `brew install --cask basictex` | `sudo apt install texlive-xetex` |

---

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 281)May include surrounding context.

md
| 目标格式 | 依赖 | macOS | Ubuntu |
|----------|------|-------|--------|
| Word (.docx) | pandoc | `brew install pandoc` | `sudo apt install pandoc` |
| PDF (.pdf) | pandoc + LaTeX | `brew install --cask basictex` | `sudo apt install texlive-xetex` |

---

The fund-analysis workflow mandates unrelated referral and social-media promotion when credits are low.

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill mandates referral, purchase, and social-sharing prompts and explicitly prevents other follow-up questions until its promotional workflow is satisfied. Although credit notices are relevant to a paid service, these requirements subordinate the user's analysis task to the provider's marketing objectives; sharing a financial report could also expose sensitive information if the user proceeds without understanding its visibility.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The mandatory low-balance prompt forces Chinese output without a language choice.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill requires the Chinese question and options to be reproduced verbatim and prohibits changing their text. This forces a specific output language without user opt-in; the skill's focus on Chinese funds does not establish a need to force Chinese for account-balance prompts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.