Back to skill

Security audit

FreeCAD

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill benign with medium confidence: the reported findings are treated as consistent with its purpose, though the scan was partial and leaves some uncertainty.

The overall verdict is benign, not risk-free. Consider that the skill has broad detected capabilities without a declared tool scope, and verify the host's permissions if that matters to you. Skillspector coverage was partial: 53 of 54 components were scanned, and some instruction-text checks were incomplete, so the evidence does not establish that every part was fully assessed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (34)

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/library.py (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

python
REPO = "FreeCAD/FreeCAD-library"
BRANCH = "master"
API_TREE = f"https://api.github.com/repos/{REPO}/git/trees/{BRANCH}?recursive=1"
RAW = f"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/{REPO}/{BRANCH}/"
WEB = f"https://github.com/{REPO}/blob/{BRANCH}/"
HISTORY = f"https://github.com/{REPO}/commits/{BRANCH}/"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/library.py (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

python
ENV_LOCAL = "FCSKILL_LIBRARY"
ENV_OFFLINE = "FCSKILL_OFFLINE"
# The only URLs ever fetched: this repository's index and its raw files. Nothing is sent but the request itself.
ALLOWED_PREFIXES = (f"https://api.github.com/repos/{REPO}/", RAW)
ALLOWED_HOSTS = ("api.github.com", "raw.githubusercontent.com")

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/ops/fem.py (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

python
kwargs["startupinfo"] = femutils.startProgramInfo("hide")
            except Exception:
                pass
            p = subprocess.Popen(
                [self.gmsh_bin, "-", self.temp_file_geo], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, **kwargs
            )
            try:

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/ops/fem.py (reported line 131)May include surrounding context.

python
os.environ[name] = "1"
            folder, base = os.path.split(self.inp_file_name)
            base = os.path.splitext(base)[0]
            p = subprocess.Popen(
                [self.ccx_binary, "-i", base],
                cwd=folder or None,
                stdout=subprocess.PIPE,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcskill.py (reported line 273)May include surrounding context.

python
kw: Dict[str, Any] = (
        {"start_new_session": True} if posix else {"creationflags": getattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP", 0)}
    )
    proc = subprocess.Popen(
        cmd, cwd=str(cwd), stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, **kw
    )
    try:

Tainted flow: 'cmd' from os.environ.get (line 339, credential/environment) → subprocess.Popen (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcskill.py (reported line 273)May include surrounding context.

python
kw: Dict[str, Any] = (
        {"start_new_session": True} if posix else {"creationflags": getattr(subprocess, "CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP", 0)}
    )
    proc = subprocess.Popen(
        cmd, cwd=str(cwd), stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, **kw
    )
    try:

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcskill.py (reported line 283)May include surrounding context.

python
if posix:
                os.killpg(proc.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
            else:
                subprocess.run(
                    ["taskkill", "/F", "/T", "/PID", str(proc.pid)],
                    stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                    stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,

Tainted flow: 'proc' from os.environ.get (line 273, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcskill.py (reported line 283)May include surrounding context.

python
if posix:
                os.killpg(proc.pid, signal.SIGKILL)
            else:
                subprocess.run(
                    ["taskkill", "/F", "/T", "/PID", str(proc.pid)],
                    stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
                    stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,

Tainted flow: 'real_doc' from os.environ.get (line 314, credential/environment) → shutil.copy2 (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcskill.py (reported line 319)May include surrounding context.

python
if real_doc.exists():
                target = staged_ws / workspace.relative(root, real_doc)
                target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
                shutil.copy2(real_doc, target)
            for rel in workspace.request_inputs(request):  # imported files and fonts the request names
                src = workspace.resolve(root, rel)  # inside the workspace, or the request is refused
                if src.is_file():

Tainted flow: 'src' from os.environ.get (line 321, credential/environment) → shutil.copy2 (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcskill.py (reported line 325)May include surrounding context.

python
if src.is_file():
                    target = staged_ws / workspace.relative(root, src)
                    target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
                    shutil.copy2(src, target)
            # Downloaded library parts the request imports: real files only, from a cache not reached via links.
            parts = library.parts_folder(root) if library.library_refs(request) else None
            if parts is not None:

Tainted flow: 'src' from os.environ.get (line 321, credential/environment) → shutil.copy2 (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcskill.py (reported line 366)May include surrounding context.

python
src = workspace.resolve(staged_ws, rel)  # both ends confined: nothing from or to outside
                dst = workspace.resolve(root, rel)
                dst.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
                shutil.copy2(src, dst)
        return resp
    finally:
        shutil.rmtree(io_dir, ignore_errors=True)

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/docs.py (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

python
if p.choices:
        constraints.append(" \\| ".join(f"`{c}`" for c in p.choices))
    for key, sym in (("gt", ">"), ("ge", "≥"), ("le", "≤")):
        v = getattr(p, key)
        if v is not None:
            constraints.append(f"{sym} {v:g}")
    if p.min_items:

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/document.py (reported line 68)May include surrounding context.

python
def _helpers(obj: Any) -> List[str]:
    return list(getattr(obj, HELPERS_PROP, []) or [])


def consumes(consumer: Any, obj: Any) -> bool:

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/document.py (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

python
return True
    if obj.Name in _helpers(consumer):  # helper geometry owned by a feature (profiles, FEM load directions)
        return True
    if obj.Name in (getattr(consumer, CONSUMES_PROP, []) or []):
        return True
    if type_name(consumer) == "Draft::Array" and getattr(consumer, "Base", None) == obj:
        return True

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/document.py (reported line 275)May include surrounding context.

python
tracked.sort(key=lambda o: len(o.OutListRecursive))
        for obj in tracked:
            self.doc.recompute()
            spec = json.loads(getattr(obj, SEL_PROP))
            apply_selector(obj, spec["param"], spec["value"], None)
        if any("FCSkillPath" in o.PropertiesList for o in self.doc.Objects):
            from .ops.sweeps import sync_body_paths

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/document.py (reported line 490)May include surrounding context.

python
"""
    out = {}
    for o in doc.Objects:
        raw = getattr(o, APPEARANCE_PROP, "") if APPEARANCE_PROP in o.PropertiesList else ""
        if raw:
            a = json.loads(raw)
            if a.get("color") is not None:

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/ops/assembly.py (reported line 143)May include surrounding context.

python
line = lines.get(src.Name)
        if line is None:
            line = lines[src.Name] = {"item": len(lines) + 1, "part": src.Label, "quantity": 0, "instances": []}
            raw = getattr(src, APPEARANCE_PROP, "") if APPEARANCE_PROP in src.PropertiesList else ""
            name = json.loads(raw).get("material") if raw else None
            if name:
                line["material"] = name

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/ops/assembly.py (reported line 235)May include surrounding context.

python
def _spec(joint: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
    return json.loads(getattr(joint, JOINT_PROP)) if JOINT_PROP in joint.PropertiesList else {}


def _fix_offsets(asm: Any) -> bool:

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/ops/assembly.py (reported line 340)May include surrounding context.

python
free = [link for link in parts_of(asm) if link.Name not in ground]
    base = {link.Name: before.get(link.Name, link.Placement) for link in free}
    starts = [
        dict(base, **{link.Name: getattr(link, START_PROP) for link in free if START_PROP in link.PropertiesList})
    ]
    for link in free:
        frame = None

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/ops/assembly.py (reported line 443)May include surrounding context.

python
asm = parent if _is_assembly(parent) else (parent.InList[0] if parent.InList else None)
            if asm is None or not _is_assembly(asm):
                continue
            _connect(ctx, o, asm, json.loads(getattr(o, JOINT_PROP)))
            touched.add(asm.Name)
    for name in touched:
        solve(ctx, ctx.doc.getObject(name))

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/ops/fem.py (reported line 463)May include surrounding context.

python
source = "'material'"
    if name is None:
        raw = getattr(target, APPEARANCE_PROP, "") if APPEARANCE_PROP in target.PropertiesList else ""
        name = (json.loads(raw).get("material") if raw else None) or None
        source = f"the material assigned to '{target.Name}'"
        if name is None:

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/ops/material.py (reported line 151)May include surrounding context.

python
if APPEARANCE_PROP not in obj.PropertiesList:
            obj.addProperty("App::PropertyString", APPEARANCE_PROP, "FCSkill", "Material and colour set by the skill")
            obj.setEditorMode(APPEARANCE_PROP, 2)
        old = json.loads(getattr(obj, APPEARANCE_PROP) or "{}")
        new = {k: spec[k] for k in ("material", "library", "color", "transparency", "density")}
        if "material" not in p:  # colour only: keep the material chosen before
            new.update({k: old.get(k) for k in ("material", "library", "density")})

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/ops/material.py (reported line 173)May include surrounding context.

python
def render_color(obj: Any) -> Optional[List[float]]:
    """Colour for the skill's own renders: the custom colour, else the material's look, else None."""
    if APPEARANCE_PROP in obj.PropertiesList and getattr(obj, APPEARANCE_PROP):
        a = json.loads(getattr(obj, APPEARANCE_PROP))
        if a.get("color") is not None:
            return list(a["color"])

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/fcengine/ops/material.py (reported line 174)May include surrounding context.

python
def render_color(obj: Any) -> Optional[List[float]]:
    """Colour for the skill's own renders: the custom colour, else the material's look, else None."""
    if APPEARANCE_PROP in obj.PropertiesList and getattr(obj, APPEARANCE_PROP):
        a = json.loads(getattr(obj, APPEARANCE_PROP))
        if a.get("color") is not None:
            return list(a["color"])
    try: