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Security audit

Claude

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is openly about renting and controlling servers, but it gives an agent payment credentials, root server control, and destroy authority with weak scoping guidance.

Review this before installing. Use a dedicated low-balance wallet, pin and verify the MCP package version, avoid exposing raw private keys where possible, store the AgentMetal API key as a secret, and require explicit approval before spending money, opening firewall ports, running root commands, renewing leases, or destroying servers.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:18
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party MCP Package Executes with Access to Wallet Credentials

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly advertises provisioning infrastructure, executing arbitrary commands as root, and destroying servers, but it does not pair these capabilities with strong safety guidance, confirmation requirements, or warnings about irreversible effects and cost exposure. In an agent context, this increases the chance of accidental destructive actions, unsafe deployment, service disruption, or financially impactful misuse if the model acts on ambiguous user prompts.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill states that a managed SSH private key is returned once, but it does not warn that this is a highly sensitive credential that grants administrative access to a live server. In an agent workflow, exposing or mishandling that key could enable unauthorized root access, persistence, data theft, or takeover of hosted services.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 86)May include surrounding context.

md
fleet management: `claim_account` → `verify_claim` (email OTP → `am_live_…` key).
- No wallet configured? The paid tools fail with a clear message; catalog/status/claim still work.
- Prefer raw HTTP? Everything is documented for agents at
  <https://api.agentmetal.dev/llms.txt>; each error envelope's `docs` field links there.