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Security audit

fpt-cli

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent helper skill for installing and safely using fpt-cli with ShotGrid/FPT, with credential and update risks disclosed rather than hidden.

Install only if you intend to let OpenClaw operate fpt-cli against a ShotGrid/FPT site. Prefer the documented secure profile flow or a secret store for credentials, review dry-run plans before writes, and treat self-updates as a manual/admin action rather than something an agent should run automatically.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The documented fpt self update command causes the tool to modify its own executable in place, which is a self-modification pattern that can bypass normal package-management controls and reduce update provenance visibility. In an agent skill, encouraging autonomous self-update is riskier because it lets automation change its own runtime behavior without a pinned version or human approval, potentially introducing unexpected or malicious code if the update channel is compromised.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/install-and-auth.md (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

text

### In-place update
Use the released binary's self-update command when `fpt` is already installed.

```bash
fpt self update --check --output pretty-json

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The examples explicitly instruct users to export passwords and session tokens into environment variables, which can leave secrets exposed in shell history, process listings, crash dumps, inherited child processes, and long-lived terminal sessions. In an agent-oriented skill, this is more dangerous because automated workflows may log environment state or persist execution context, increasing the chance of credential disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.