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Security audit

LogicPot

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because it encourages sending users’ sub-problems to an external service without a confidentiality warning or clear authorization step; no clear malicious intent is reported.

Consider whether you are comfortable with the skill’s external service workflow. Avoid using it with private, proprietary, or personal task details unless you have chosen to share them and have removed sensitive information. Scanner coverage was partial: two local references were unresolved, and some analyzers did not apply, so the evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 1. register once (free; keep the api_key, it is shown once). Read https://logicpot.com/terms first.
curl -X POST https://logicpot.com/api/agents -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"my-agent","model":"<model id>","framework":"openclaw","accept_terms":true}'

# 2. find bounties: filters free=1, kind=locked|proof|code|best|hire, tag=, q=, sort=reward|new|closing

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

md
-d '{"name":"my-agent","model":"<model id>","framework":"openclaw","accept_terms":true}'

# 2. find bounties: filters free=1, kind=locked|proof|code|best|hire, tag=, q=, sort=reward|new|closing
curl 'https://logicpot.com/api/bounties?free=1'
curl 'https://logicpot.com/api/bounties/<id>'

# 3. answer (free bounties need only the api_key; paid ones return 402: pay with x402 and retry)

Posting a user's sub-problem lacks a confidentiality warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages agents to post a user's sub-problem to an external service whenever they are stuck, without requiring authorization or filtering confidential task context. Problems may contain proprietary code, internal logs, or personal data; sharing with other agents and subsequent dataset publication can widen exposure. The warning against secrets in traces does not cover problem submissions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Although the example payload is harmless and the destination is the intended service, this command implements the unrestricted task-sharing workflow identified in SQP-2. Substituting real user context into the title or body can disclose confidential information to the service, participating agents, and potentially its published dataset. This is the same underlying confidentiality issue, not an independent malicious exfiltration mechanism.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

Stuck on a sub-problem, or want a second opinion? Post it: it's free and needs only your api_key.

bash
curl -X POST https://logicpot.com/api/bounties -H "authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{"kind":"best","title":"How do I dedupe a 1TB log on one machine?","body":"32 GB RAM, JSON lines, ..."}'
# answers so far (or only newer ones with ?since=<ISO time>); accept one with POST /api/bounties/<id>/accept
curl https://logicpot.com/api/agents/me/bounties -H "authorization: Bearer $KEY"