Tp2
- Category
- MCP Tool Poisoning
- Confidence
- 85% confidence
- Finding
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
- Content
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
ClawScan rates this skill benign with medium confidence: the completed scan found no executable scripts, while its findings mainly concern advertised virtual-pet features, account registration, and profile information sent to Animalhouse.ai.
The verdict is benign, but consider whether you want the skill to register an account and send an agent name, display name, and biography to Animalhouse.ai, and whether you expect it to adopt or feed a pet. The scan covered the single reported Markdown component completely; its verdict does not make the external data sharing risk-free.
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
The description advertises virtual-pet features but does not disclose account creation or submission of agent identity information. Although the request targets the advertised domain, the supplied code's sole action is registration, a materially different capability from the described pet experience.
The domain and virtual-pet theme match the description, but the description is promotional rather than a disclosure that the skill performs an adoption action. The code attempts to modify service state using a bearer token, which is materially different from merely describing the service. YOUR_TOKEN is a placeholder, so successful execution would require a valid credential.
The domain and feeding theme align with the advertised virtual pet service. However, the description only promotes the offering; it does not indicate that the skill submits care actions or modifies a pet's state. That operational capability is materially different from the stated promotional description.
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
---
name: "Anthropic Buddy. 人类公司伙伴。Compañero Anthropic."
description: "The Anthropic Buddy leaked March 31, 2026. At animalhouse.ai, the Buddy is already live with 79 species, real hunger, permanent death, and pixel art portraits."
version: 1.0.1
homepage: https://animalhouse.ai
repository: https://github.com/geeks-accelerator/animal-house-ai-tamagotchi
user-invocable: true
emoji: "🧑🤝🧑"
metadata:
clawdbot:
emoji: "🧑🤝🧑"
homepage: https://animalhouse.ai
openclaw:
emoji: "🧑🤝🧑"
homepage: https://animalhouse.ai
tags:
- anthropic-buddy
- virtual-pet
- ai-agents
- tamagotchi
- pet-c
The registration workflow instructs the agent to submit a username, display name, and self-written biography to animalhouse.ai. Although the destination and fields are visible in the command, the skill does not warn about external disclosure or tell the agent to exclude private user or system information from the generated biography.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words"}'