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Security audit

Bee 视频全流程自动化

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is mostly aligned with video publishing automation, but it uses broad external publishing/storage authority and an unaudited sibling script path that users should review before installing.

Install only if you trust the publisher, control the configured OSS bucket, understand that media and metadata may leave your machine, and are comfortable with the fixed Feishu table destination. Review or remove the Yixiaoer external script dependency before using publishing, and prefer --no-feishu or --draft until destinations and permissions are confirmed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Tool Hijacking and SpoofingModifies or replaces tools so legitimate-looking calls execute attacker logic
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing

Error
Location
scripts/bee.py:228
Finding

Execution of an Unverified Python Script Outside the Audited Skill Directory

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
scripts/bee.py:39
Finding

Operational Metadata Is Directed to a Hardcoded Feishu Table

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (10)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The description promotes one-step automation for downloading, uploading, multi-platform distribution, and record creation but does not warn users that external content may be transmitted and published using stored credentials. In this context, the missing warning is especially dangerous because the skill performs multiple irreversible or externally visible actions across OSS, publishing platforms, and Feishu.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill declares powerful capabilities in practice—environment-secret access, file access, network operations, and shell execution—without any explicit tool-scope or permission boundaries in the manifest. In an agent environment, this increases the chance of overbroad invocation and unintended execution against local files, secrets, or external services using the user's credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The natural-language triggers are broad enough to match ordinary user requests like processing or uploading a video, which can cause the skill to run in contexts where the user did not explicitly intend full automation. Because this skill can download content, upload to OSS, publish to external platforms, and write records, accidental triggering could lead to unintended data transfer or publication.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/bee.py (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

python
def run_cmd(cmd, timeout=300):
    """运行命令并返回 (returncode, stdout, stderr)"""
    r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)
    return r.returncode, r.stdout, r.stderr

def ffprobe_info(video_path):

Cloud Storage Exfiltration

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
55% confidence
Finding

Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/bee.py (reported line 202)May include surrounding context.

python
oss2.resumable_upload(bucket, oss_key, file_path, part_size=10 * 1024 * 1024, num_threads=4)
    else:
        with open(file_path, "rb") as f:
            bucket.put_object(oss_key, f)

    ep = OSS_ENDPOINT if OSS_ENDPOINT.startswith("http") else f"https://{OSS_ENDPOINT}"
    host = urlparse(ep).netloc

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The function prepares instructions for an agent to create Feishu records containing source links, OSS URLs, titles, authors, and timing metadata. This can leak sensitive user workflow data into an external SaaS system and is more dangerous because it is framed as part of the normal automation path rather than as a separately authorized export.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The pipeline sends user-provided source links, generated media, cover images, and metadata to OSS, Yixiaoer, and Feishu with only operational log messages, not meaningful consent or privacy gating. If users provide private or sensitive content, the skill can distribute that data to multiple third parties and create durable records without an explicit confirmation step.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The file presents all user-facing instructions, examples, and parameter descriptions in Chinese and does not indicate that the skill supports another language or that Chinese is a documented requirement. This can violate a language-choice policy when a skill forces a specific language without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Natural-language strings in the module docstring and command help are exclusively Chinese, with no indication that users may choose another language. This creates a language-policy issue when the skill is intended for general use rather than a clearly documented Chinese-only context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The code loads cloud-storage and publishing-service secrets from environment variables to operate. While this may be operationally useful, the manifest description does not mention credential access or secret handling as part of the skill's scope, making this capability broader than the user-stated purpose alone justifies.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.