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Security audit

Clh Export

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because it reports serious payment and transaction-signing weaknesses, an unverified remote installer, and capabilities that may exceed the stated purpose.

Consider avoiding installation until the payment and transaction-signing checks are independently reviewed, and the installer and package versions can be verified. The scan was incomplete, so it does not establish that the remaining material is safe.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/agentkit_support.py
Finding

Automatic AgentKit signing does not bind SIWE authentication to the requested service

Content
View full analysis

Impact

An attacker can obtain a valid wallet-authentication signature for another service. Where that service accepts the relayed SIWE message and attacker-held challenge session, the attacker can authenticate as the victim wallet. This is authentication-signature phishing, not disclosure of the raw private key.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/verify_webhook_payment.py
Finding

Webhook verification accepts previously valid payment deliveries without replay checks

Content
View full analysis

Impact

The same captured payment event can repeatedly pass this verifier. Receivers that grant credits, extend entitlements, or deliver goods after each successful verification without their own idempotency protection can fulfill one payment multiple times.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (149)

Tainted flow: 'wallet' from os.getenv (line 38, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check_credits.py (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

python
print(f"Checking credits for: {endpoint_slug}")
    print(f"Wallet: {wallet}")

    response = requests.get(
        url,
        params={"action": "balance", "wallet": wallet},
        headers={"Accept": "application/json"},

Tainted flow: 'payment_payload' from os.getenv (line 253, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The payload contains a payment authorization, not the private key, so this is not raw credential exfiltration. However, the script automatically signs the server-provided recipient and amount without a user-approved spending limit or recipient check, allowing a malicious or compromised payment response to obtain an authorization for an excessive USDC transfer.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/consume_product.py (reported line 273)May include surrounding context.

python
# Step 4: Make request with payment
    print("\nStep 3: Submitting payment and requesting download...")
    
    response = requests.get(
        api_url,
        headers={
            "X-Payment": json.dumps(payment_payload),

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.getenv (line 64, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/erc8004_wallet_client.py (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

python
headers: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None,
    timeout: int = 60,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
    response = requests.post(url, json=body, headers=headers or {}, timeout=timeout)
    try:
        data = response.json()
    except Exception:

Tainted flow: 'headers' from os.getenv (line 51, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_on_marketplace.py (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

python
if banner_url:
        print(f"  Banner: {banner_url}")

    response = requests.post(url, json=data, headers=headers)

    if response.status_code in [200, 201]:
        result = response.json()

Tainted flow: 'headers' from os.getenv (line 96, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_on_marketplace.py (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

python
print(f"Unlisting endpoint: {slug} from marketplace...")

    response = requests.post(url, json=data, headers=headers)

    if response.status_code == 200:
        result = response.json()

Tainted flow: 'api_key' from os.getenv (line 233, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/manage_endpoint.py (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

python
def get_endpoint_info(slug: str, api_key: Optional[str] = None) -> dict:
    response = requests.get(
        f"{API_BASE}/agent/endpoints",
        params={"slug": slug},
        headers=_build_headers(api_key),

Tainted flow: 'endpoint_id' from os.getenv (line 88, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/manage_endpoint.py (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

python
"details": details,
        }

    response = requests.get(
        f"{API_BASE}/agent/endpoints",
        params={"action": "stats", "endpoint_ids": endpoint_id},
        headers={"Accept": "application/json"},

Tainted flow: 'api_key' from os.getenv (line 161, credential/environment) → requests.patch (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/manage_endpoint.py (reported line 165)May include surrounding context.

python
if not api_key:
        return {"error": "Update requires X_API_KEY or API_KEY"}

    response = requests.patch(
        f"{API_BASE}/agent/endpoints",
        params={"slug": slug},
        headers={**_build_headers(api_key), "Content-Type": "application/json"},

Tainted flow: 'api_key' from os.getenv (line 52, credential/environment) → requests.patch (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/manage_webhook.py (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

python
def set_webhook(slug: str, webhook_url: str) -> dict:
    """Set or update the webhook URL for an endpoint."""
    api_key = _load_api_key()
    response = requests.patch(
        f"{API_BASE}/agent/endpoints",
        params={"slug": slug},
        json={"webhook_url": webhook_url},

Tainted flow: 'api_key' from os.getenv (line 73, credential/environment) → requests.patch (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/manage_webhook.py (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

python
def remove_webhook(slug: str) -> dict:
    """Remove the webhook URL from an endpoint."""
    api_key = _load_api_key()
    response = requests.patch(
        f"{API_BASE}/agent/endpoints",
        params={"slug": slug},
        json={"webhook_url": None},

Tainted flow: 'api_key' from os.getenv (line 88, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/manage_webhook.py (reported line 89)May include surrounding context.

python
def get_webhook_info(slug: str) -> dict:
    """Check if an endpoint has a webhook configured."""
    api_key = _load_api_key()
    response = requests.get(
        f"{API_BASE}/agent/endpoints",
        params={"slug": slug},
        headers={"X-API-Key": api_key, "Accept": "application/json"},

Tainted flow: 'signed_tx_base64' from os.getenv (line 223, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/solana_signing.py (reported line 225)May include surrounding context.

python
signed_tx = VersionedTransaction(raw_tx.message, [keypair, *(extra_signers or [])])
    signed_tx_base64 = base64.b64encode(bytes(signed_tx)).decode()

    response = requests.post(
        rpc_url,
        json={
            "jsonrpc": "2.0",

Tainted flow: 'BASE' from os.getenv (line 38, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/stake_sgl.py (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

python
# ─── API helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

def _get(path: str) -> dict:
    r = requests.get(f"{BASE}{path}", timeout=TIMEOUT)
    data = r.json()
    if not r.ok:
        sys.exit(f"GET {path} failed ({r.status_code}): {data.get('error', data)}")

Tainted flow: 'BASE' from os.getenv (line 38, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

BASE is not itself a credential, but this POST helper participates in a flow that accepts arbitrary server-prepared transactions, signs them without inspecting their instructions, and returns executable signed transactions. A compromised staking service or malicious URL override could substitute wallet-draining transfers or approvals; the printed warning does not enforce the requested staking intent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/stake_sgl.py (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

python
def _post(path: str, body: dict) -> dict:
    r = requests.post(f"{BASE}{path}", json=body, timeout=TIMEOUT)
    data = r.json()
    if not r.ok:
        msg = data.get("error", data)

Tainted flow: 'url' from os.getenv (line 44, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_feedback.py (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

python
else:
        body["agentId"] = agent_id

    response = requests.post(
        url,
        json=body,
        headers={

Tainted flow: 'STUDIO_BASE' from os.getenv (line 25, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/support_threads.py (reported line 68)May include surrounding context.

python
def _resolve_listing(listing_type: str, listing_ref: str) -> Dict[str, str]:
    if listing_type == "endpoint" and not listing_ref.startswith("http") and len(listing_ref) < 64:
        response = requests.get(f"{STUDIO_BASE}/api/public/endpoints/{listing_ref}", timeout=30)
        if response.status_code == 200:
            data = response.json()
            return {"listing_id": data["id"], "listing_type": "endpoint", "name": data.get("name") or listing_ref}

Tainted flow: 'STUDIO_BASE' from os.getenv (line 25, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/support_threads.py (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

python
if listing_ref.startswith("http"):
        slug = listing_ref.rstrip("/").split("/")[-1]
        if listing_type == "endpoint":
            response = requests.get(f"{STUDIO_BASE}/api/public/endpoints/{slug}", timeout=30)
            if response.status_code == 200:
                data = response.json()
                return {"listing_id": data["id"], "listing_type": "endpoint", "name": data.get("name") or slug}

Tainted flow: 'API_BASE' from os.getenv (line 24, credential/environment) → requests.get (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/support_threads.py (reported line 82)May include surrounding context.

python
return {"listing_id": data["id"], "listing_type": "endpoint", "name": data.get("name") or slug}

    # fallback to marketplace search by id/slug
    response = requests.get(f"{API_BASE}/api/marketplace", params={"search": listing_ref, "limit": 50}, timeout=30)
    response.raise_for_status()
    data = response.json()
    listings = data.get("listings", [])

Tainted flow: 'api_key' from os.getenv (line 46, credential/environment) → requests.put (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/topup_endpoint.py (reported line 68)May include surrounding context.

python
headers=headers,
        )

    response = requests.put(
        url,
        params=params,
        json=data,

Tainted flow: 'api_key' from os.getenv (line 46, credential/environment) → requests.put (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/topup_endpoint.py (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

python
except Exception as exc:
        return {"error": f"Failed to build {selected_network} payment: {exc}"}

    response = requests.put(
        url,
        params=params,
        json=data,

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The command fetches an unpinned script and immediately executes it, making installation trust whatever the server returns at that moment. HTTPS does not protect against compromise of the server or release process, and injected code could access locally available wallet secrets.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

Self-Hosted

bash
curl -fsSL https://api.x402layer.cc/skill/x402-layer/install | bash

v1.11.1 keeps the Studio webhook hardening guidance and adds direct fundraiser campaign management through owner-linked dashboard API keys alongside the PAT-backed MCP path.

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The pipe connects unverified network input directly to a shell interpreter, crossing the data-to-code trust boundary. This is the same underlying installer vulnerability as the external-script finding, rather than evidence of a separate malicious tool chain.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

Self-Hosted

bash
curl -fsSL https://api.x402layer.cc/skill/x402-layer/install | bash

v1.11.1 keeps the Studio webhook hardening guidance and adds direct fundraiser campaign management through owner-linked dashboard API keys alongside the PAT-backed MCP path.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Fundraiser campaign management is a distinct capability not disclosed in the declared purpose. Creating campaigns and configuring their fundraising targets and fee allocation are not merely implementation details of API monetization, agent registration, or staking. The general reference to Singularity Layer operations does not clearly disclose this additional primary function. The credential types and service domain are consistent with the description; the mismatch is the undeclared campaign-management functionality, not evidence of credential theft or local transaction signing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Campaign management is not among the declared capabilities. The supplied commands expose a distinct owner-scoped resource rather than an evident implementation detail of endpoint payments, marketplace listings, agent management, or staking. Dashboard API-key use is consistent with the description, but it does not account for the undeclared campaign operations. The script implementation is not supplied, so this assessment is limited to the visible invocations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Endpoint information retrieval and API-key authentication are consistent with the declared purpose. However, campaign management is a distinct capability not described among the payment, endpoint, identity, reputation, or staking functions. The supplied chunk explicitly exposes campaign listing and creation. Script internals are unavailable, so this assessment does not assume fund transfers or other hidden behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.