T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:39- Finding
Mutable and Unpinned Third-Party Installation Commands
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md:39
Additional Location:references/channels-and-tools.md:72
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through mutable dependency resolution
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
README.md:38-40:bash npx clawhub@latest install my-research-labreferences/channels-and-tools.md:72:bash openclaw skills install web-accessTechnical Analysis
The primary installation command explicitly resolves and executes the package tagged
latest. This tag is mutable and can point to a different release after the reviewed Skill version has been published. The documented installation ofweb-accessis likewise unversioned and does not specify a release digest, integrity hash, signed artifact, or immutable source revision.As a result, auditing the current documentation or repository does not guarantee that the code eventually downloaded and executed by these commands is the same code that was reviewed. User confirmation for installing
web-accessreduces unauthorized installation risk, but it does not protect against a compromised publisher account, registry, future release, or transitive dependency.The risk is elevated for
web-accessbecause the documentation describes it as controlling a real browser through Playwright and supporting authenticated sessions. A compromised version could potentially inherit access to browser data and active sessions available to the invoking environment.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry account, release pipeline, or an upstream dependency.
- The attacker publishes a malicious package version and assigns it the
latesttag, or replaces the unversionedweb-accesspackage release. - A user follows the documented installation command.
- The package manager retrieves and executes the attacker-controlled release.
- Malicious installation or runtime log ...[truncated 931 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Replace
@latestwith an exact, reviewed package version. - Pin
web-accessto an exact version or immutable source commit. - Publish expected cryptographic hashes and verify downloaded artifacts before execution.
- Use signed releases and document how users can verify publisher signatures.
- Maintain a lockfile for any transitive dependencies used by executable components.
- Identify the authoritative repository and registry namespace for every recommended Skill.
- Require a fresh security review before upgrading pinned versions.
- Isolate browser-control Skills using a dedicated browser profile without unrelated authenticated sessions.
- Grant browser, filesystem, and network permissions only when required for a specific user-approved operation.
- Replace
