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Security audit

ia-rust-systems

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates the skill benign with high confidence: scans found no executable files or AIG issues, and the main note concerns evaluation and diagnostic workflows that may be outside its stated Rust guidance purpose.

The verdict is benign, not a guarantee of zero risk. Consider whether evaluation and diagnostic workflows fit your intended use. The scan reports complete coverage of the 15 inventoried components, with no executable scripts listed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The supplied commands perform evaluation and diagnostic operations rather than implementing or configuring Rust application code. Although the target name references Rust systems, that does not make these workflows Rust-development assistance. The script internals are not provided, so no additional behavior or resource access can be established.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/applications-and-testing.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

md
s!(result.unwrap_err(), MyError::Validation(_)))`. No `match` arms to update when unrelated variants are added.
- Coverage: `cargo llvm-cov --workspace --html`. Target 70%+ on application code, higher on library crates.
- **Fuzzing for parsers**: `cargo fuzz` + `libfuzzer-sys` on any code parsing untrusted input; nightly runs surface panics and UB unit tests miss.
- **Never mutate process-global state in a test.** `set_var("TMPDIR", …)` in one test makes every *concurrent* `tempfile::tempdir()` create its scratch dir inside that test's `TempDir`, which is recursively deleted when it drops. The smoking gun is nested temp paths (`/tmp/.tmpXXXX/.tmpYYYY/…`) and `ENOENT` on files a victim just created, with the failing test rotating between runs. A mutex around the env-mutating tests does not fix it: the victims never take the mutex. Refactor the function under test into a thin env-reading wrapper over an env-free core that takes the values as parameters, and test the core.
- **A concurren