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Security audit

演读 DECK 产线与发布

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marks this skill benign with medium confidence: most reported behavior appears purpose-aligned, but some code was only partly inspected and the scanners flagged a few capabilities for review.

The verdict is benign, but confidence is medium and coverage is partial: Skillspector reports 20 of 22 components scanned, two partly inspected, and some image content outside its analysis. Before installing, consider whether you need the publishing features and whether you trust their environment and network use; the scan does not confirm the host runtime’s permission limits.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (11)

Incomplete referenced artifact analysis

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

md
- `scripts/publish.py`(发布脚本)、`scripts/sync-from-harness.sh`(真身→副本单向同步)、`assets/functions/api/comments.js`(留言板后端)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/留言板-D1.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

md
## 4. 已有防护(改的时候别拆掉)

昵称 ≤24 / 正文 ≤500;`SHA256(salt|IP)` 前 32 位做限频(同 IP 20s 一条,**不存明文 IP**);蜜罐字段 `website`(机器人填了就静默丢);`ensureSchema` 幂等自建表;渲染端 `esc()`(`textContent`→`innerHTML`)防 XSS;`PAGE_RE` 白名单把非法 page(`../etc/passwd`)归 `home`,挡路径注入。

## 5. 部署踩坑

Code capability 'env' detected in scripts/publish.py but not covered by declared permissions.

High
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

The skill uses 'env' capability that is not covered by the declared 'allowed-tools' preapproval. Review the host runtime's actual enforcement policy; runtime permissions are unknown unless separately verified, and this declaration alone does not establish a permission ceiling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Code capability 'network' detected in scripts/publish.py but not covered by declared permissions.

High
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

The skill uses 'network' capability that is not covered by the declared 'allowed-tools' preapproval. Review the host runtime's actual enforcement policy; runtime permissions are unknown unless separately verified, and this declaration alone does not establish a permission ceiling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/publish.py (reported line 476)May include surrounding context.

python
# 重写了一半。所以这里实跑一次确认可用,不可用就当没有,走下面的缓存兜底。
    def _usable(exe: str) -> bool:
        try:
            subprocess.run([exe, "--help"], capture_output=True, check=True, timeout=30)
            return True
        except (OSError, subprocess.SubprocessError):
            return False

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/publish.py (reported line 496)May include surrounding context.

python
CJK_CACHE.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
        for srcname, outname in CJK_JOBS:
            outf = OUT / "fonts" / outname
            subprocess.run([pyft, str(CJK_SRC / srcname), f"--text-file={charfile}",
                            "--flavor=woff2", f"--output-file={outf}",
                            "--no-hinting", "--desubroutinize"], check=True)
            shutil.copy2(outf, CJK_CACHE / outname)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/publish.py (reported line 592)May include surrounding context.

python
exe = ensure_wrangler()
    if exe is None:
        return
    res = subprocess.run([exe, "whoami"], capture_output=True, text=True)
    out = (res.stdout + res.stderr).lower()
    if res.returncode != 0 or "not authenticated" in out or "not logged" in out:
        print("\n🔑 还没登录 Cloudflare。在终端跑一次(浏览器授权):")

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/publish.py (reported line 600)May include surrounding context.

python
print("   登录后重跑:python3 演读DECK/publish.py --deploy")
        return
    # 项目不存在则创建(已存在会报错,忽略)
    subprocess.run([exe, "pages", "project", "create", CF_PROJECT,
                    "--production-branch", "main"], capture_output=True)
    # 显式 --project-name,与 YANDU_CF_PROJECT 一致;仍在 SELF 读 wrangler.toml 拿 D1/functions
    cmd = [exe, "pages", "deploy", "dist",

Tainted flow: 'CF_PROJECT' from os.environ.get (line 38, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/publish.py (reported line 600)May include surrounding context.

python
print("   登录后重跑:python3 演读DECK/publish.py --deploy")
        return
    # 项目不存在则创建(已存在会报错,忽略)
    subprocess.run([exe, "pages", "project", "create", CF_PROJECT,
                    "--production-branch", "main"], capture_output=True)
    # 显式 --project-name,与 YANDU_CF_PROJECT 一致;仍在 SELF 读 wrangler.toml 拿 D1/functions
    cmd = [exe, "pages", "deploy", "dist",

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/publish.py (reported line 608)May include surrounding context.

python
"--branch", "main", "--commit-dirty=true"]
    print(f"\n🚀 部署到 Cloudflare Pages: {' '.join(cmd)}  (cwd={SELF})")
    try:
        subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, cwd=str(SELF))
        print(f"\n✅ 部署完成!公开地址:https://{cf_project}.pages.dev")
    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
        sys.exit(f"❌ 部署失败(exit {e.returncode})。先 `wrangler login`;若报 D1 绑定错,"

Tainted flow: 'cmd' from os.environ.get (line 603, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/publish.py (reported line 608)May include surrounding context.

python
"--branch", "main", "--commit-dirty=true"]
    print(f"\n🚀 部署到 Cloudflare Pages: {' '.join(cmd)}  (cwd={SELF})")
    try:
        subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, cwd=str(SELF))
        print(f"\n✅ 部署完成!公开地址:https://{cf_project}.pages.dev")
    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e:
        sys.exit(f"❌ 部署失败(exit {e.returncode})。先 `wrangler login`;若报 D1 绑定错,"