Back to skill

Security audit

Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill provides a cloud Mac for app development and publishing, with its powerful permissions, cloud storage, and credential handling clearly disclosed.

Treat NoMac as a provider receiving your uploaded source and supplied credentials. Sync only the intended project, keep unrelated secrets out of the account, and remember that the cloud drive persists after stopping. Consider disabling automatic CLI updates and pinning optional tools. Stop sessions when finished and approve public submission yourself. This review covers the bundled instructions, not the external CLI or hosted service implementation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 92)May include surrounding context.

md
says so when that limit stops it; SSH can run longer within session limits.
CLI sync sends every file but secrets, and symlinks as links, and skips
dependency and build folders, .git and folders .gitignore lists. Secrets stay
on this computer: .env files (not .env.example), .p8, .p12, .pfx, keystores,
private SSH keys, .netrc, and .pem or .key files with a private key. Give them
to every Mac encrypted with `nomac secrets set --from-env-file .env` or
`nomac secrets set NAME --file PATH`. A `!` line in .nomacignore sends any of

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 93)May include surrounding context.

md
CLI sync sends every file but secrets, and symlinks as links, and skips
dependency and build folders, .git and folders .gitignore lists. Secrets stay
on this computer: .env files (not .env.example), .p8, .p12, .pfx, keystores,
private SSH keys, .netrc, and .pem or .key files with a private key. Give them
to every Mac encrypted with `nomac secrets set --from-env-file .env` or
`nomac secrets set NAME --file PATH`. A `!` line in .nomacignore sends any of
them anyway. A file changed on the Mac since the

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx wrangler'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Although Wrangler is a development-server example rather than an MCP server, npx wrangler dev can download and execute an unpinned package when no local installation exists. A compromised future release could execute in a cloud Mac environment that has project access, account-provided secrets, and passwordless administrator privileges.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx -y @anthropic-ai/claude-code'.

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This command launches an agent CLI rather than an MCP server, but npx -y @anthropic-ai/claude-code still permits execution of an unpinned release without an installation confirmation. A compromised release would run on the Mac with access to project files and potentially API keys and other injected secrets; the documented administrator access increases the consequences.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 145)May include surrounding context.

md
## A Mac fully enabled for you

The Mac is yours to do anything on: the `agent` account is an administrator,
sudo needs no password, macOS asks for no administrator password, and the
Mac's login password is in `$NOMAC_MAC_PASSWORD` (for the login keychain, such
as `security unlock-keychain -p "$NOMAC_MAC_PASSWORD"`, or any prompt).
Privacy prompts are answered Allow as they appear, and `nomac-permit APP