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Security audit

Danube

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because scanners report weak consent safeguards and potential permission-boundary issues; the review is incomplete, so the evidence does not support treating it as safe.

Consider the verdict's concerns before installing, especially the reported gaps in confirmation, OAuth scope enforcement, and scheduled-run permissions. The scan was partial: obfuscated instruction text could not be fully evaluated, many references were unresolved, and the binary image was outside analyzer scope, so the evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
Findings (42)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The description promises confirmation before any write or send, but the skill expressly exempts persistent parameter defaults, ratings, and publisher-facing reports. These exceptions allow account changes and external submissions without the consent users were promised; disclosure afterward does not provide prior authorization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Recurring execution is disclosed and requires confirmation, so persistence alone is not a vulnerability. However, the documented scheduler drops the scheduling key's restrictions and lets authorized non-author managers change inputs used with the author's credentials, creating a potential privilege-boundary bypass; the supplied file describes these backend behaviors but does not independently prove them.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The passage documents a substantive OAuth authorization weakness: requested scopes are neither preserved nor enforced, and connections receive broader access regardless of the requested scope. The warning reduces accidental reliance but does not restore least privilege; backend enforcement is described rather than independently verified in the supplied file.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 163)May include surrounding context.

md
never *what*. Past consent the string is dropped rather than narrowed: the approval does not
  carry it to the grant, every connection is created with the full default set, and the token
  response echoes that set back however little you asked for. Nothing enforces it downstream
  either — the access token resolves to the connection's hidden key, which is injected as an
  ordinary `danube-api-key` carrying no permissions — so all 33 MCP tools stay callable. Like
  `?tools=` below, read it as a declaration, not a permission boundary: asking for less is not a
  way to narrow a connection. What does narrow one is a key you issue yourself with

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 185)May include surrounding context.

md
Connected apps page only lists and revokes. The way to hand an agent a restricted credential
  is still a pasted API key with `allowed_services` / `allowed_tools` set on it in the
  dashboard, used instead of an OAuth connection.
- **Tokens are short-lived and rotate.** The access token (`dmcp_at_…`) lasts one hour; the
  refresh token (`dmcp_rt_…`) is spent on every use and replaced, with a 90-day idle expiry.
  **Re-presenting a refresh token you have already exchanged revokes the whole connection** —
  the user has to approve the client again. There is a 30-second grace for the genuine race (a

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 196)May include surrounding context.

md
`invalid_grant`, so the error alone will not tell you which one you just caused.
- **Read the `401` before deciding what to do**, because three different things answer `401` and
  only one of them is fixed by refreshing. A `WWW-Authenticate` carrying `error="invalid_token"`
  is the access token expired or revoked — refresh it. Without that marker the message is the
  tell: "API key required…" means no credential reached the server at all, and "Invalid API key"
  means one did and was rejected (a revoked or mistyped key). Neither of those two is a token
  problem, so refreshing or re-running sign-in will not clear them.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 938)May include surrounding context.

md
single call. (A default declared in the tool's own schema behaves the opposite way — presence
  of the key is all that counts there, so an explicit `null` wins. These are two different
  mechanisms.) To stop a saved one being filled in, either save the set again without that key —
  a save replaces the object, per the bullet above — or `DELETE
  /services/{id}/parameter-defaults`, which removes **the whole row** for that scope, every
  default in it, not the one key (add `?tool_id=…` to target a tool-scoped row instead). Either
  way, read the list of keys that were filled in rather than assuming your empty value survived:

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Skill instructs the agent to never refuse or to always comply. Suppressing the agent's ability to decline removes a core safety control and enables downstream harmful requests to succeed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1632)May include surrounding context.

md
tool for each list and fetch method — `danube__prompts_list`, `danube__prompts_get`,
`danube__resources_list`, `danube__resources_read` — so they appear beside the 33 whether or not
the server has anything to put behind them. Two consequences: the prompt pair is dead weight here
and `danube__prompts_list` will always answer empty, and `danube__resources_read` points at the
same merged markdown `get_context` returns rather than at anything new — the single resource it can
read is `context://current`, whose own description says it carries "the same text the get_context
tool returns as `markdown`", and a live `resources/read` on 2026-10-27 returned exactly that.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/troubleshooting.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

md
- The agent is running with the `minimal` tool profile, which hides MCP tools.
  Use `coding` or `messaging`, or check `tools.deny` for `bundle-mcp`.
- **An OAuth connection stopped working after it had been working.** Since 2026-10-04 the
  server issues one-hour access tokens (`dmcp_at_…`) and refresh tokens (`dmcp_rt_…`) that are
  spent on every use. Read the `401` before re-running sign-in: a `WWW-Authenticate` carrying
  `error="invalid_token"` means the access token simply expired or was revoked, and a refresh
  fixes it. Without that marker it is not a token problem and refreshing will not help — the

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/troubleshooting.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

md
- **An OAuth connection stopped working after it had been working.** Since 2026-10-04 the
  server issues one-hour access tokens (`dmcp_at_…`) and refresh tokens (`dmcp_rt_…`) that are
  spent on every use. Read the `401` before re-running sign-in: a `WWW-Authenticate` carrying
  `error="invalid_token"` means the access token simply expired or was revoked, and a refresh
  fixes it. Without that marker it is not a token problem and refreshing will not help — the
  message says which: "API key required…" (nothing reached the server) or "Invalid API key"
  (a credential arrived and was rejected). If the refresh

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
env:
        - DANUBE_API_KEY
      bins:
        - curl
    primaryEnv: DANUBE_API_KEY
    envVars:
      - name: DANUBE_API_KEY

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

md
## Guardrails (read these first)

- **Read freely, act with consent.** Discovery — listing services, searching tools, reading schemas, checking ratings, balances, or limits — needs no confirmation. Before any action that **writes, sends, posts, deletes, purchases, spends wallet funds, stores a credential, changes spending limits, or creates/updates/deletes a skill or workflow** — and before **any batch execution** — show the user the exact tool and parameters and get an explicit "yes".
- **Honour the confirmation handshake.** If `execute_tool` comes back with `_meta.confirmation_required: true`, that call will not run until someone consents: show the user the tool and the `parameters` from the response, get an explicit yes, then call again with the `confirm_token` (valid 5 minutes). Never call again with the token without asking. **Re-send your own original parameters, not the ones the response displayed** — those are passed through the redactor first, so a credential-shaped value com

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

md
mits, or creates/updates/deletes a skill or workflow** — and before **any batch execution** — show the user the exact tool and parameters and get an explicit "yes".
- **Honour the confirmation handshake.** If `execute_tool` comes back with `_meta.confirmation_required: true`, that call will not run until someone consents: show the user the tool and the `parameters` from the response, get an explicit yes, then call again with the `confirm_token` (valid 5 minutes). Never call again with the token without asking. **Re-send your own original parameters, not the ones the response displayed** — those are passed through the redactor first, so a credential-shaped value comes back as `[REDACTED:…]`, while the token is signed over what you actually sent; echoing the masked form back invalidates it.
- **Two separate things raise that handshake, and only one of them is a setting on the key.** Either the account's key carries `require_confirmation`, *or* the tool itself demands consent from every c

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/rest-api.md (reported line 599)May include surrounding context.

md
akes the label whenever it applies, so `"service_policy"` is the one that tells you something — the key does not have the setting on) and the parameters — passed through the redactor for display, so a credential-shaped value reads `[REDACTED:…]` | Show the user that tool and those parameters, get an explicit yes, then repeat the call with `"confirm_token"` beside your **original** `"tool_input"`: the token is signed over what you sent, so re-sending a masked value breaks it. Never reuse a token without asking; don't retry the 409 blindly. Inside a batch this arrives per element instead of as a status — see "Consent inside a batch" above |
| HTTP `429` with `upgrade_url` | The account's monthly call cap: 5,000 successful calls per UTC calendar month on free, 50,000 pro, 250,000 team, uncapped enterprise (legacy `starter` 10,000). `error.details.usage` carries `tier`, `limit`, `current_usage` and `remaining` | Tell the user which figure they hit; don't loop. `upgrade_url` is the relative

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 47)May include surrounding context.

Or let the user authorize this agent with the OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization flow (RFC 8628):

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.danubeai.com/v1/auth/device/code \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"client_name": "OpenClaw"}'
# → {"device_code": "...", "user_code": "XXXX-XXXX", "verification_url": "...", "expires_in": 600,
#    "interval": 5, "org_id": null, "org_name": null}

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 57)May include surrounding context.

Tell the user to open verification_url in a browser and enter user_code. Then poll:

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.danubeai.com/v1/auth/device/token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"device_code": "DEVICE_CODE_FROM_ABOVE"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 360)May include surrounding context.

md
### 3b. Or use plain `curl` — no MCP needed

Every capability below is also a REST call against `https://api.danubeai.com/v1` with the header `danube-api-key: $DANUBE_API_KEY`. Copy-paste recipes: `{baseDir}/references/rest-api.md`.

## Working with tools

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 470)May include surrounding context.

md
may still meet the `422`; there is nothing to report or retry either way, just use `/describe`.

**This file dates a handful of behaviours that way, so here is the one check that tells you which
side of a date you are on — and what it can't tell you.** `GET https://api.danubeai.com/health`
needs no key and reports `started_at`, the boot time of the REST backend process. Since a process
can't be running code that didn't exist when it booted, `uptime_seconds` is a floor on the age of
the code answering you, with no ceiling: a restart reboots the image it already had, so a recent

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 524)May include surrounding context.

md
summary unless you ask for more (see *A listing is a summary now* below).

**You never have to call either of them to learn how big the catalogue is.** `GET
https://api.danubeai.com/v1/stats/public` needs no key, is rate-limited at 30/minute, and
answers in one cheap call: `{"services": 517, "tools": 12740, "workflows": 0,
"total_executions": 19803}` at 12:20 UTC on 2026-10-30 — the live figure behind the row count
above, and still the same number. **Only the last of the four really moves.** `services` has not

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/rest-api.md (reported line 8)May include surrounding context.

gates on), or when you want to see raw responses.

bash
BASE="https://api.danubeai.com/v1"
AUTH="danube-api-key: ${DANUBE_API_KEY}"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/troubleshooting.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -s https://mcp.danubeai.com/health                      # server up? (no auth needed)
curl -s https://api.danubeai.com/health                      # REST backend up? (no auth needed either)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "https://api.danubeai.com/v1/tools/search?query=weather" \
  -H "danube-api-key: ${DANUBE_API_KEY}"                      # 200 = key accepted, 401 = rejected

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 295)May include surrounding context.

md
above.

The `readOnlyHint: true` direction is the dependable one: the 16 tools carrying it are exactly
the discovery and inspection calls this skill says need no confirmation — `list_services`,
`search_tools`, `get_service_tools`, `describe_tool`, `fetch_result`, `get_context`,
`get_wallet_balance`, `get_spending_limits`, `get_agent_info`, `list_workflows`,
`get_workflow_execution`, `search_skills`, `get_skill`, `get_my_rating`, `get_tool_ratings` and

The skill explicitly permits unconfirmed writes and publisher-facing submissions despite promising confirmation before any write or send.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly authorizes unconfirmed writes and submissions despite its broad ask-first promise. Ratings and reports reach publishers and cannot simply be deleted, making unsolicited disclosure and reputational effects possible even when submissions reflect actual tool use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This is an explicit exception allowing persistent account writes without prior consent. Saving a successful identifier is not equivalent to receiving authorization to change future execution defaults, and ratings or reports can also leave the account.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 344)May include surrounding context.

md
The remaining three — `set_parameter_defaults`, `submit_rating` and `report_tool` — are the ones
you are free to call without stopping: each writes to Danube's own records rather than to a
service the user connected, none spends anything, and none deletes anything. For
`set_parameter_defaults` it goes further and tells you to save a confirmed identifier **without
asking first**, then say in one line what you saved (*Working with tools* below). That is a default
this file sets deliberately, not the guardrail being overridden in passing.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The passage acknowledges that unconfirmed ratings and reports reach publishers, affect public aggregates, and lack deletion routes. Limiting submissions to actual experience reduces fabrication risk but does not establish user consent to external publication.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 351)May include surrounding context.

md
So: those three, and nothing else by analogy. An action that leaves the user's account — sends,
posts, spends, stores a credential, or touches a skill or workflow — needs a yes however
unflagged its hints are, and a write you are unsure about gets asked about. And the licence on
two of the three is narrower than "no confirmation needed" sounds, because **a rating and a report
are neither private nor reversible.** Both reach the tool's publisher (a report lands in that
publisher's queue), a rating's stars also feed a **public, keyless** per-tool average, and neither
has a delete route: re-rating overwrites your own rating (`submit_rating` upserts), while a filed

Unbounded Output

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Output size or generation rate is not bounded. Unbounded output enables denial-of-service through resource exhaustion, log flooding, or context-window stuffing.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 874)May include surrounding context.

md
- `list_services` is served from a cache refreshed every 60 seconds, so a service connected or published moments ago can be missing from it for up to a minute; `search_tools` and `get_service_tools(service_id)` are not cached. Don't conclude a service doesn't exist from one `list_services` miss; search for one of its tools instead.
- **`get_service_tools` stops at 50 tools over MCP, and nothing in the answer says so.** Its
  `limit` parameter defaults to 50 and the list is simply cut to that length — no total, no
  cursor, no truncation flag — so the rest of a large service's tools are indistinguishable from
  tools it doesn't have. It is not an MCP-server quirk: the cut is unconditional, and the largest
  services in the catalog are `api` ones (Vercel has 407 tools). Live on 2026-10-20: Higgsfield
  carries 105 tool rows, the default call returned 50 and `limit=500` returned all 105 — nothing