T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:9- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies and Unverified Repository Script Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md:9,README.md:19-24, andSKILL.md:72-82
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependencies and execution of unverified remote repository content
Risk Level: MediumEvidence
README.md:9:powershell # Windows pip install openclawREADME.md:19-24:powershell # Clone the bundle repository git clone https://github.com/clawhub/ai-secretary-bundle.git cd ai-secretary-bundle # Install all dependent skills ./install.ps1SKILL.md:72-82:powershell # Install email management py -m clawhub install email-mail-master # Install scheduled reminders py -m clawhub install qqbot-cron # Install news collection py -m clawhub install ai-news-collector # Install task tracking py -m clawhub install task-trackerTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions retrieve packages and repository content without pinning exact versions, immutable Git commit identifiers, or cryptographic hashes. Consequently, the content installed by these commands can change after the Skill has been audited.
The README also instructs the user to execute
install.ps1immediately after cloning the repository's default branch. That script is absent from the audited artifact, so its contents and security properties could not be reviewed. No signature, checksum, commit validation, or manual inspection step is required before execution.Although the reviewed files do not contain a malicious payload, this installation pattern creates a supply-chain trust boundary. Compromise of a package registry account, dependency release, repository account, or mutable default branch could cause attacker-controlled code to be installed and executed.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises one of the referenced package publisher accounts, upstream Skill packages, or the Git repository's mutable default branch.
- The attacker publishes a malicious p ...[truncated 1175 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
openclawand every ClawHub Skill to exact, reviewed versions rather than resolving the latest available release. - Clone an immutable, reviewed Git commit or signed release tag instead of executing content from the repository's default branch.
- Publish and verify SHA-256 or stronger cryptographic hashes for downloaded packages and scripts.
- Require signature verification for package releases and Git tags where supported.
- Include
install.ps1in the distributed artifact so it can be reviewed alongside the documentation and configuration. - Display or review the installation script before execution rather than invoking it immediately after cloning.
- Use lockfiles or a signed dependency manifest containing exact versions, source locations, and integrity hashes.
- Perform installation in a non-administrative, isolated environment with minimal filesystem and network permissions.
- Add automated dependency provenance, vulnerability, and integrity checks to the release process.
- Pin
