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Security audit

Poyo Grok Imageine

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent PoYo video-generation helper, with normal third-party API submission risks and a credential-handling caution.

Before installing, confirm you are comfortable sending video prompts, image URLs, callback URLs, and related job metadata to PoYo. Use POYO_API_KEY rather than passing the key on the command line, avoid submitting secrets or private media, and rotate the key if it has previously been exposed in shell history or shared logs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/submit_grok_imagine.sh:4
Finding

API Key Exposure Through Command-Line Arguments

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: scripts/submit_grok_imagine.sh, lines 4–6
Vulnerability Type: API key exposure through process arguments and shell history
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

sh
api_key="${POYO_API_KEY:-${1:-}}"
if [ -z "$api_key" ]; then
  echo "Usage: submit_grok_imagine.sh [api_key] [payload.json]" >&2

Technical Analysis

When POYO_API_KEY is unset, the script accepts the PoYo API key as its first positional argument. Supplying secrets through command-line arguments is unsafe because the complete invocation may be retained in shell history. Depending on operating-system process visibility and local security controls, command-line arguments may also be observable through process-inspection interfaces while the script is running.

The usage message explicitly advertises this insecure invocation mode, increasing the likelihood that users will place the key on the command line. Although the script also supports the safer POYO_API_KEY environment variable, it does not require that mechanism.

Attack Path

  1. A user runs the script with the API key as the first argument, as supported by the script's usage instructions.
  2. The command containing the plaintext key is saved in shell history or becomes temporarily visible through local process inspection.
  3. Another local user or process with sufficient access reads the exposed command-line value.
  4. The attacker extracts the API key and uses it to authenticate directly to the PoYo API.
  5. The attacker submits unauthorized generation requests under the victim's account until the key is revoked or otherwise restricted.

Impact Assessment

A recovered API key grants the attacker the API permissions assigned to that credential. This can enable unauthorized video-generation requests, consumption of account credits or quotas, and activity attributed to the victim's account.

The issue does not itself provide operating-system privilege escalation or arbitr ...[truncated 190 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove support for accepting the API key as a positional command-line argument.
  • Require POYO_API_KEY to be set before the script runs, and revise the usage message so it no longer advertises command-line secret entry.
  • If interactive secret entry is needed, read the key from a terminal with input echo disabled rather than placing it in process arguments.
  • For automation, support a protected secret file or dedicated file descriptor with restrictive permissions.
  • Avoid printing, logging, or including the key in diagnostic output.
  • Recommend rotating any key that was previously supplied on the command line and removing affected entries from shell-history files where feasible.
  • Prefer a hardened interface such as:
sh
api_key="${POYO_API_KEY:-}"
if [ -z "$api_key" ]; then
  echo "POYO_API_KEY must be set." >&2
  exit 1
fi
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (12)

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: poyo-grok-imagine
description: Grok Imagine video generation on PoYo / poyo.ai via `https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit`; use for `grok-imagine`, text-to-video, image-to-video, 6s/10s clips, and `fun` / `normal` / `spicy` mode control.
metadata: {"openclaw": {"homepage":"https://poyo.ai/models/grok-imagine", "requires": {"bins": ["curl"], "env": ["POYO_API_KEY"]}, "primaryEnv": "POYO_API_KEY"}}

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

Content-Type: application/json

text

Get API keys from <https://poyo.ai/dashboard/api-key>.

Recommended skill env var:

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill is explicitly designed to transmit data to https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit, which means user-supplied prompts and possibly image references leave the local trust boundary. While external transmission is expected for this capability, it is still security-relevant because sensitive content could be disclosed to a third party if users are not clearly informed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: poyo-grok-imagine
description: Grok Imagine video generation on PoYo / poyo.ai via `https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit`; use for `grok-imagine`, text-to-video, image-to-video, 6s/10s clips, and `fun` / `normal` / `spicy` mode control.
metadata: {"openclaw": {"homepage":"https://poyo.ai/models/grok-imagine", "requires": {"bins": ["curl"], "env": ["POYO_API_KEY"]}, "primaryEnv": "POYO_API_KEY"}}
---

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs use of a third-party API for prompt submission and optional image-to-video inputs, but it does not warn that user prompts and referenced image URLs will be transmitted to PoYo. This creates a privacy and informed-consent issue because users may unknowingly send sensitive text or media references to an external service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

Submission example

bash
curl -sS https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit   -H 'Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY'   -H 'Content-Type: application/json'   -d '{
  "model": "grok-imagine",
  "callback_url": "https://your-domain.com/callback",
  "input": {

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The script accepts a sensitive credential from POYO_API_KEY or the command line and uses it for authentication. There is no warning or explanatory comment about passing secrets via CLI arguments or environment variables, even though command-line arguments can be exposed in shell history or process listings.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api.md (reported line 5)May include surrounding context.

md
body=$(cat)
fi

curl -sS https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit   -H "Authorization: Bearer $api_key"   -H 'Content-Type: application/json'   -d "$body"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

md
body=$(cat)
fi

curl -sS https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit   -H "Authorization: Bearer $api_key"   -H 'Content-Type: application/json'   -d "$body"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_grok_imagine.sh (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

sh
body=$(cat)
fi

curl -sS https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit   -H "Authorization: Bearer $api_key"   -H 'Content-Type: application/json'   -d "$body"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_grok_imagine.sh (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

sh
body=$(cat)
fi

curl -sS https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit   -H "Authorization: Bearer $api_key"   -H 'Content-Type: application/json'   -d "$body"

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This shell script performs a network request to an external endpoint and transmits the provided payload body along with an authorization token. Aside from the usage syntax, the file does not include a confirmation prompt, visible disclosure, or explanatory comment warning that input data will be sent off-host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

This markdown file instructs the user to send a bearer API key and recommends storing it in an environment variable, but it does not include any caution about keeping the key secret or avoiding exposure in logs, scripts, or shared terminals. Because markdown files should warn about behaviors affecting privacy or system integrity, the omission is a mild safety disclosure gap.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.