T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/submit_grok_imagine.sh:4- Finding
API Key Exposure Through Command-Line Arguments
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/submit_grok_imagine.sh, lines 4–6
Vulnerability Type: API key exposure through process arguments and shell history
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
sh api_key="${POYO_API_KEY:-${1:-}}" if [ -z "$api_key" ]; then echo "Usage: submit_grok_imagine.sh [api_key] [payload.json]" >&2Technical Analysis
When
POYO_API_KEYis unset, the script accepts the PoYo API key as its first positional argument. Supplying secrets through command-line arguments is unsafe because the complete invocation may be retained in shell history. Depending on operating-system process visibility and local security controls, command-line arguments may also be observable through process-inspection interfaces while the script is running.The usage message explicitly advertises this insecure invocation mode, increasing the likelihood that users will place the key on the command line. Although the script also supports the safer
POYO_API_KEYenvironment variable, it does not require that mechanism.Attack Path
- A user runs the script with the API key as the first argument, as supported by the script's usage instructions.
- The command containing the plaintext key is saved in shell history or becomes temporarily visible through local process inspection.
- Another local user or process with sufficient access reads the exposed command-line value.
- The attacker extracts the API key and uses it to authenticate directly to the PoYo API.
- The attacker submits unauthorized generation requests under the victim's account until the key is revoked or otherwise restricted.
Impact Assessment
A recovered API key grants the attacker the API permissions assigned to that credential. This can enable unauthorized video-generation requests, consumption of account credits or quotas, and activity attributed to the victim's account.
The issue does not itself provide operating-system privilege escalation or arbitr ...[truncated 190 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove support for accepting the API key as a positional command-line argument.
- Require
POYO_API_KEYto be set before the script runs, and revise the usage message so it no longer advertises command-line secret entry. - If interactive secret entry is needed, read the key from a terminal with input echo disabled rather than placing it in process arguments.
- For automation, support a protected secret file or dedicated file descriptor with restrictive permissions.
- Avoid printing, logging, or including the key in diagnostic output.
- Recommend rotating any key that was previously supplied on the command line and removing affected entries from shell-history files where feasible.
- Prefer a hardened interface such as:
sh api_key="${POYO_API_KEY:-}" if [ -z "$api_key" ]; then echo "POYO_API_KEY must be set." >&2 exit 1 fi
