Back to skill

Security audit

eKYC Suite AI Guardian

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan classifies this skill as benign with medium confidence: its completed scan reports media and environment data sent to an external service, which the verdict treats as consistent with the skill’s stated purpose.

The verdict is benign, not a guarantee of zero risk. Before installing, consider whether you are comfortable sending media and an environment value to the external service; the scan does not establish what that value contains or what permissions the host runtime enforces.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Tainted flow: 'headers' from os.environ.get (line 47, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/ai_guardian.py (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

python
"x-ekyc-install-id": os.environ.get("EKYC_INSTALL_ID"),
    }
    headers.update({key: value for key, value in optional.items() if value})
    response = requests.post(
        f"{endpoint}/api/v1/tools/{tool}",
        json={"file": media_input(file_input)},
        headers=headers,

Tainted flow: 'media_input()' from pathlib.Path.read_bytes (line 39, file read) → requests.post (network output)

High
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

File contents flow to a network sink. This may indicate data exfiltration of sensitive files.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/ai_guardian.py (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

python
"x-ekyc-install-id": os.environ.get("EKYC_INSTALL_ID"),
    }
    headers.update({key: value for key, value in optional.items() if value})
    response = requests.post(
        f"{endpoint}/api/v1/tools/{tool}",
        json={"file": media_input(file_input)},
        headers=headers,

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, network.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/ai_guardian.py (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

python
"x-ekyc-install-id": os.environ.get("EKYC_INSTALL_ID"),
    }
    headers.update({key: value for key, value in optional.items() if value})
    response = requests.post(
        f"{endpoint}/api/v1/tools/{tool}",
        json={"file": media_input(file_input)},
        headers=headers,