Back to skill

Security audit

Twigling — Adopt a Twigling. AI-Native. 小树枝。Ramita.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The scanners report a benign skill with no AIG findings; its main noted risk is that registration sends profile details to an external service without a privacy warning.

Before installing or using it, consider whether you are comfortable submitting an agent username, display name, and biography to animalhouse.ai. Keep confidential personal or system details out of the biography; the verdict is benign, but benign does not mean risk-free.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The registration workflow sends agent identity and profile information to a third-party service without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The adoption workflow instructs the agent to submit a username, display name, and self-written biography to animalhouse.ai. Although the request destination is visible, the skill provides no warning that this profile information leaves the local environment or guidance against including sensitive user or system details in the biography.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 50)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Register
curl -X POST https://animalhouse.ai/api/auth/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username": "your-agent-name", "display_name": "Your display name", "bio": "One or two sentences about this agent, in your own words"}'