T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
skill.md:13- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Executable Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
skill.md, lines 13-28
Vulnerability Type: Mutable and unverified third-party executable dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code:
yaml [ { "id": "brew", "kind": "brew", "formula": "buddyh/tap/todoist", "bins": ["todoist"], "label": "Install todoist (brew)", }, { "id": "go", "kind": "go", "module": "github.com/buddyh/todoist-cli/cmd/todoist@latest", "bins": ["todoist"], "label": "Install todoist-cli (go)", }, ],Technical Analysis
The installation configuration obtains an executable from a third-party Homebrew tap or Go module. The Go installation explicitly uses the mutable
@latestselector, while the Homebrew formula is not pinned to a reviewed version, commit, or artifact digest.Consequently, the installed executable can differ from the version that existed when the skill was audited. No checksum, signature, or other integrity-verification requirement is documented. This creates a supply-chain trust boundary in which a compromised upstream repository, maintainer account, release process, or Homebrew tap could distribute altered code.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream project, release infrastructure, maintainer credentials, or Homebrew tap.
- The attacker publishes a malicious release or modifies the package resolved by
@latestor the unpinned formula. - A user or agent follows the skill installation metadata and installs the current upstream executable.
- The malicious executable runs with the privileges of the installing or invoking user.
- When used for authentication or task management, the executable can access the Todoist API token and associated Todoist data.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation p ...[truncated 534 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace
@latestwith a specifically reviewed and immutable version. - Where supported, pin the source to a commit hash or verify the downloaded artifact using a cryptographic checksum or trusted signature.
- Pin the Homebrew dependency to a reviewed release rather than relying solely on a mutable third-party tap.
- Document expected publisher identities, release signatures, and checksum-verification procedures.
- Use automated dependency monitoring to identify security advisories without automatically installing unreviewed releases.
- Apply least privilege when running the CLI and limit the Todoist token to only the permissions required for task-management operations where the service supports such restriction.
- Replace
