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Security audit

Todoist CLI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Todoist CLI helper, but users should handle the Todoist token carefully and understand it installs an unpinned third-party CLI.

Install only if you trust the buddyh Todoist CLI source and prefer interactive authentication rather than typing the API token directly into a command. Review the upstream CLI before use if your Todoist account contains sensitive personal or business data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
skill.md:13
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Executable Installation

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: skill.md, lines 13-28
Vulnerability Type: Mutable and unverified third-party executable dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

yaml
        [
          {
            "id": "brew",
            "kind": "brew",
            "formula": "buddyh/tap/todoist",
            "bins": ["todoist"],
            "label": "Install todoist (brew)",
          },
          {
            "id": "go",
            "kind": "go",
            "module": "github.com/buddyh/todoist-cli/cmd/todoist@latest",
            "bins": ["todoist"],
            "label": "Install todoist-cli (go)",
          },
        ],

Technical Analysis

The installation configuration obtains an executable from a third-party Homebrew tap or Go module. The Go installation explicitly uses the mutable @latest selector, while the Homebrew formula is not pinned to a reviewed version, commit, or artifact digest.

Consequently, the installed executable can differ from the version that existed when the skill was audited. No checksum, signature, or other integrity-verification requirement is documented. This creates a supply-chain trust boundary in which a compromised upstream repository, maintainer account, release process, or Homebrew tap could distribute altered code.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the upstream project, release infrastructure, maintainer credentials, or Homebrew tap.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release or modifies the package resolved by @latest or the unpinned formula.
  3. A user or agent follows the skill installation metadata and installs the current upstream executable.
  4. The malicious executable runs with the privileges of the installing or invoking user.
  5. When used for authentication or task management, the executable can access the Todoist API token and associated Todoist data.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation p ...[truncated 534 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace @latest with a specifically reviewed and immutable version.
  • Where supported, pin the source to a commit hash or verify the downloaded artifact using a cryptographic checksum or trusted signature.
  • Pin the Homebrew dependency to a reviewed release rather than relying solely on a mutable third-party tap.
  • Document expected publisher identities, release signatures, and checksum-verification procedures.
  • Use automated dependency monitoring to identify security advisories without automatically installing unreviewed releases.
  • Apply least privilege when running the CLI and limit the Todoist token to only the permissions required for task-management operations where the service supports such restriction.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
skill.md:41
Finding

Todoist API Token Exposed Through a Command-Line Argument

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: skill.md, lines 41-50
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive credential exposure through process arguments and shell history
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash
# Interactive
todoist auth

# Direct
todoist auth <your-token>

# Or set environment variable
export TODOIST_API_TOKEN=<your-token>

Technical Analysis

The documentation recommends passing the Todoist API token directly as a command-line argument. Depending on the operating system and shell configuration, command-line arguments may be exposed through shell history, process inspection, terminal logging, audit telemetry, debugging output, or copied command transcripts.

Although process-argument visibility can be brief, shell history and monitoring records may retain the credential after the command finishes. The environment-variable alternative can also expose the token to child processes and diagnostic tooling, but the direct command-line example presents the clearest documented credential-disclosure risk.

Attack Path

  1. A user follows the documented direct-auth example and enters the Todoist API token in the command line.
  2. The shell stores the command in its history, or local process-monitoring or audit software records the command arguments.
  3. Another local user, process, support operator, or party with access to collected logs retrieves the token.
  4. The attacker uses the recovered token to authenticate to Todoist.
  5. The attacker reads or modifies Todoist resources within the token's authorized scope.

Impact Assessment

Disclosure of the token can grant access to the victim's Todoist account through the API. Based on the skill's documented capabilities, an attacker may be able to view, create, update, move, complete, reopen, or delete tasks and may access or manage projects, labels, sections, and comments.

This issue does not itself provide operating-system pri ...[truncated 115 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove the example that passes the API token as a command-line argument.
  • Prefer an interactive authentication flow that reads the secret with terminal echo disabled.
  • Where supported, use an operating-system credential manager or protected configuration file with restrictive permissions.
  • If an environment variable must be used, instruct users to set it without placing the value directly in persistent shell history and to unset it after use.
  • Warn users not to include tokens in scripts, screenshots, logs, issue reports, or command transcripts.
  • Ensure the CLI redacts credentials from errors, debug output, telemetry, and configuration displays.
  • Recommend immediate token revocation and rotation if accidental disclosure is suspected.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep